Rumor Has It that Non-Celebrity Gossip Web Site Operators are Overestimating Their Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act by Minora, Matthew
RUMOR HAS IT THAT NON-CELEBRITY
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Matthew Minorat
"Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a
trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a beautiful afternoon on a college campus in the United States. One
student, Jane Doe, is walking to her first class of the day. Strolling across the
green, well-manicured lawns, her mind is focused on upcoming assignments
and plans for the weekend. Before reaching her first class, the student notices a
crowd of people, including her friends and fellow classmates, gathering around
a public bulletin board on campus. Her serene afternoon is shattered when she
sees a large sign on that the bulletin board that reads: "Jane Doe is a whore!"2
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I Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
196 (1890).
2 See Richard Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008,
at ST7 (discussing how the former Web site, JuicyCampus, allowed posts about the "biggest
slut on campus" or "the most promiscuous sorority sister"); Sunny Hostin, Online Campus
Gossips Won't Show Their Faces, CNN.cOM, Apr. 11, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/
2008/CRIME/03/17/sunny.juicy/index.html (discussing the experience of a college fresh-
man who had been targeted on a gossip Web site). See generally College ACB,
http://www.collegeacb.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (allowing users to post gossip
anonymously).
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The student runs through the crowd of onlookers and tries to tear down the
sign, but soon realizes that, despite her best efforts, she cannot.
The sign is affixed to the bulletin board permanently. As her eyes swell with
tears, the student notices that the crowd is growing and overhears people dis-
cussing whether the statement is true. Looking for help, the student contacts
the owners of the bulletin board, begging the owners to remove the sign or at
least disclose who posted it, but they refuse. Frustrated, the student threatens to
sue the bulletin board owners for defamation. The owners scoff at her threats
and explain that they actually are protected by federal law and are not required
to remove the sign. Although this may sound like a nightmare, it is happening
with greater frequency on American college campuses, albeit on online bulletin
boards rather than physical ones.
Simply put, anonymous college gossip has left the bathroom wall and gone
online Much of the gossip is posted anonymously,4 leaving the subjects of the
gossip with little legal recourse. The operators of such non-celebrity gossip
Web sites are immune from state tort claims arising from third party content
under section 509 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA").'
Unless the plaintiff can establish that the operator of a site where third parties
can post anonymous messages actually created or developed the content, the
CDA shields the operator from claims arising from third party content. 6 How-
ever, the CDA does not shield operators from a claim of misappropriation of
intellectual property posted on their Web sites, regardless of who contributed
the infringing content.'
Recent cases have clarified that intellectual property violations by Web site
operators include violations of both federal and state intellectual property
laws-including violations of the right of publicity.8 This may allow the target
3 Richard Morgan, Juicy Campus: College Gossip Leaves the Bathroom Wall and Goes
Online, IHT.cOM, Mar. 18, 2008, http://iht.com/articles/2008/03/18/arts/gossip.php [herein-
after Morgan, College Gossip Leaves the Bathroom Wall].
4 See College ACB, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.collegeacb.com/sb.php?
school=general&page=faq#isanon (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter College ACB
FAQ] ("Is this site really anonymous? Yes. No one can use this site to figure out who you
are. Nor can anyone use this site to figure out which posts you have made."); Gossip Report,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.gossipreport.com/faq.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2009) [hereinafter Gossip Report FAQ] ("Q: Can other members figure out who I am? A:
You can remain anonymous .... GossipReport.com will not disclose any members' e-mail
addresses nor do we ask for your real name.").
5 See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509, § 230(c),
110 Stat. 56, 137 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000)); infra Part Il1.
6 Id. § 230(c)(l)-(2).
7 Id. § 230(e)(2).
8 See, e.g., Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.N.H. 2008)
(finding enforcement of federal and state intellectual property laws preserved under section
230(e) of the CDA); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413-14
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of gossip to prove that the online gossip uses his or her image in a commercial
manner, thereby allowing the individual to file a claim against the Web site
operator regardless of the operator's role in the creation of the content.
This Comment examines the potential liability for non-celebrity gossip Web
site operators despite their CDA immunity. Part II identifies several non-
celebrity gossip Web sites and describes the public's reaction to them. It fur-
ther demonstrates that despite their claims to the contrary, some gossip Web
sites operators' actions may actually violate the CDA. Part III analyzes the
CDA, its underlying policies, and how the courts have interpreted it. Part IV
examines the growth and development of the right of publicity and the ele-
ments necessary to establish a prima facie claim for violation of the right.
Part V discusses the possibility that gossip Web site operators may violate
an individual's right of publicity. Finally, Part VI concludes that while non-
celebrity gossip Web site operators enjoy broad immunity for content provided
by third parties under the CDA, the immunity is not absolute if confronted with
a violation of an individual's right of publicity.
II. THE GROWTH OF NON-CELEBRITY GOSSIP WEB SITES: "GOSSIP
LEAVES THE BATHROOM WALL AND GOES ONLINE 9
Celebrity gossip has become a part of American culture." Seeing celebrities'
faces plastered on magazines in grocery stores, on entertainment news shows,
and on Internet gossip sites is a common occurrence." As a possible reaction to
this celebrity gossip overkill, non-celebrity gossip Web sites are increasingly
more common. 2 As one Web site operator explained, "[p]eople want to know
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to limit the intellectual property exception to pre-1996 situa-
tions). Contra Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (de-
fining "intellectual property" as only "federal intellectual property" absent a more specific
statutory definition, which would not include a likeness as intellectual property).
9 Morgan, College Gossip Leaves the Bathroom Wall, supra note 3.
10 Amy Henderson, Media and the Rise of Celebrity Culture, OAH MAGAZINE OF His-
TORY, Spring 1992, at 49, available at http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/communication/
henderson.html (documenting the shift in American culture from a focus on character to a
focus on personality and how celebrity status became a "measure of success" in a personal-
ity-based culture).
I I See Press Release, Pew Research Ctr. for People & the Press, Bush Veto Draws Large
Audience: Too Much Celebrity News, Too Little Good News (Oct. 12, 2007), available at
http://people-press.org/report/362/too-much-celebrity-news-too-little-news (finding that
forty percent of Americans believe celebrity news receives too much attention from the
media); Mary McCarthy, Celebrity Gossip Magazines: Best in Print, Best on the Web, Oct.
23, 2007, http://celebrities.suite 101 .com/article.cfm/celebritygossipmagazines (listing top
celebrity news magazines and Web sites); LovetoKnow.com, Top 10 Celebrity Gossip Web
Sites, http://lovetoknow.com/top 10/celbrity-gossip.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
12 Kelly Heyboer, Psst! Rumor Has It Gossip Websites Hit Home, STAR LEDGER (N.J.),
June 22, 2008, at 1 ("[A] growing number of websites are offering a place for anonymous
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about their neighbors.... [not] Britney Spears."' 3 Growing in both number and
popularity, non-celebrity gossip Web sites have become places for neighbors,
classmates, and coworkers to gossip anonymously about each other with few
consequences.'4 Unsurprisingly, these sites have become "replete with sopho-
moric comments; rude, lewd speech; and nasty, puerile insults."" The negative
effects of these sites on communities, especially college campuses, have been
felt across the country. 6 Students have suffered from the revelation of the pro-
verbial skeletons in their closets. 7 Female students have reported harassment,
both online and in real life, 8 and many students feel the posting of their name
or likeness on these Web sites has affected their job prospects through no fault
of their own. 9
The popularity of non-celebrity gossip Web sites has steadily increased
users to post stories, gossip and rumors about average people."); Susan Kinzie, Juice, the
Whole Juice and Nothing but the Juice, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2008, at BO1 (noting that one
popular non-celebrity gossip Web site, JuicyCampus, had nearly 50,000 individual visitors
during September 2008). However, despite the exponential growth of such sites, JuicyCam-
pus, one of the largest non-celebrity gossip sites, officially shut down on February 5, 2009.
Posting of JuicyCampus to Official JuicyCampus Blog, A Juicy Shutdown,
http://www.juicycampus.blogspot.com (Feb. 4, 2009, 11:47 EST). The founder and chief
executive of JuicyCampus, Matt Ivester, blames "these historically difficult economic
times" for the drastic fall in advertising revenue leading to the site's demise. Id.
13 Heyboer, supra note 12 (quoting Nik Richie, blogger for TheDirty.com).
14 See id.; Kinzie, supra note 12.
Is Posting of Greg Lukianoff to Huffington Post, Breaking News: Offensive and Untrue
Material Discovered on the Internet!, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-lukianoff/
breaking-news-offensive- b 94314.html (Mar. 31, 2008, 16:47 EST).
16 See, e.g., Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, supra note 2 (reporting that a
post about a Yale University student's past participation in gay pornography devastated the
student); see also Kinzie, supra note 12 (discussing the concerns of college students about
future employers relying on gossip Web site postings when considering candidates).
17 See Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, supra note 2 (reporting that a Yale
University student's past participation in gay pornography became the subject of a post and
was seen by nearly twenty percent of the students within a few days).
18 Hostin, supra note 2 (reporting that one girl's entire college experience could be
"tainted" after seeing gossip about her posted on JuicyCampus); Eamon McNiff & Ann
Varney, College Gossip Crackdown: Chelsea Gorman Speaks Out, ABC News, May 14,
2008, http://abcnews.go.com/2020/Story?id=4849927 (reporting that gossip on JuicyCam-
pus reported one female student's rape-an experience unknown to most of her friends);
Martha Neil, Yale Students Unmask Anonymous Critics; Legal Careers at Risk, ABAJOUR-
NAL.COM, July 31, 2008, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/yale-studentsunmask_
anonymouscriticslegal-careers at risk [hereinafter Neil, Yale Students] (noting that fe-
male law students have been harassed and possibly rejected for jobs because of online post-
ings).
19 See, e.g., Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, supra note 2 (discussing a pub-
lic relations student concerned postings about her will make finding a job more difficult);
Neil, Yale Students, supra note 18 (reporting that one student lost his job because of his
association with AutoAdmit, a law school discussion board, although he may not have
posted anything on the Web site).
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since their inception. ° Internet gossip browsers now have several options when
deciding what type of non-celebrity gossip they would like to read as many
non-celebrity gossip Web sites categorize their gossip by subject, city, or col-
lege campus.2' Depending on the Web site, a typical gossip post includes the
name of the target of the gossip, the person's location or college, a statement or
story about him or her, and on occasion a photograph of the person.22 Other
users can post replies to this gossip, usually adding even more salacious con-
tent.23 The anonymous nature of these Web sites allows gossipers to post lewd,
salacious, and defamatory information about others. In some instances, the
site operators even join the fun, adding their own original content to users'
gossip.2
In light of the potential negative consequences of being named on a gossip
Web site, a question arises: What can individuals do if they find themselves the
subject of a defamatory post? The reply from the Web site operators: Noth-
ing.26 The site operators are aware of the broad protection from liability for
defamation under the CDA. The legal sections of these Web sites explain to
the user that the site operator cannot be held responsible for the content gener-
20 See Heyboer, supra note 12. At the time of its closure, JuicyCampus had "expanded
to more than 500 campuses across the US." See A Juicy Shutdown, supra note 12.
21 See, e.g., College ACB, supra note 2 (allowing users to post and comment on any
topic in university specific forums and to sort the posts by topic); The Dirty,
http://www.thedirty.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2009) (allowing people to post pictures and
comments according to colleges, cities, or subject matter); Gossip Report,
http://www.gossipreport.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2009) (allowing users to create profiles
anonymously for other people and allowing people to search by name, city, school, or by
tags); USAGoneDirty.com, http://www.usagonedirty.com/usa/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2009)
(allowing users to post pictures and comments according to their universities).
22 See The Dirty, supra note 21 (allowing users to post names of individuals, what col-
lege they attend, pictures, and gossip); Gossip Report, supra note 21 (allowing users to cre-
ate profiles of other people, using the other person's pictures and personal information); see
also discussion infra Part lII.C (detailing information about each gossip site).
23 See College ACB, supra note 2 (allowing users to reply to post); The Dirty, supra
note 21 (allowing users to comment on posts); Gossip Report, supra note 21 (allowing users
to "Add Gossip" to a profile); see also infra Part III.C.2.
24 See Kinzie, supra note 12 (noting that users post "rumors about sex, drugs, college
life and sex."); Lukianoff, supra note 15 (claiming that posts alleging "sexual promiscuity,
illegal behavior, and having a 'loathsome' . . . disease" are per se liable if false).
25 See, e.g., The Dirty, Club Thrust, Nov. 11, 2008, http://www.thedirty.com/?p=54245
[hereinafter Club Thrust] (showing a post of the Dirty's site operator, Nik Richie, comment-
ing, "Let me guess ... not out of the closets yet. -nik" under a user posted photograph of
men in sleeveless shirts and cowboy hats).
26 See, e.g., The Dirty, Kochran Kardashian, Nov. 12, 2007, http://www.thedirty.com/
?p=1226 (displaying an e-mail from the Dirty's attorney explaining the Dirty is not liable
for defamatory statements of others and unwilling to remove a posted photograph at the
pictured's request); USAGoneDirty.com, Terms of Service, http//www.usagonedirty.com/
usa/terms.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2009) (explaining that the Web site is not responsible or
liable for third-party content).
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ated by a third party, and the operator is under no duty to remove the posted
gossip.27 The site operators capitalize on and exploit their CDA immunity in
order to make a profit regardless of the ramifications that the anonymous gos-
sip has on others, leaving victims frustrated and angry.28
This sense of frustration, among other things, has turned university adminis-
trators and student government associations into the most vocal proponents of
banning campus access to anonymous gossip Web sites.29 Undeterred by free
speech concerns," opponents on college campuses feel that the "destructive
dialogue" that these sites allow encourages cowardly gossipers to undermine
and distract from the main goal of college universities: to provide an educa-
tion." Moreover, opponents of the gossip sites feel that these sites "en-
courag[e] people to be the worst versions of themselves," spewing hateful
speech and hiding behind the sites' anonymity. 2 Opponents of non-celebrity
gossip sites also argue that the hateful speech posted on the sites can incite vio-
lence among students in the real world.33 For these reasons, several university
27 The Dirty, FAQs, http://thedirty.com/?pageid=301 (last visited Feb. 11, 2009) [here-
inafter The Dirty FAQ]
3. Someone posted a false story/comment about me! Isn't that defamation?
Again, since this is not a first year law school class, we won't bore you with the long
version, but you need to understand a couple of import concepts about defamation.
[E]ven if someone posts a comment which is false and defamatory, you cannot sue The
Dirty for publishing it. Why? Because of a special law called the Communications De-
cency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
Id.
28 See id.; cf The Dirty, Kochran Kardashian, supra note 26.
29 See Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, supra note 2; Andy Canales, SGA
Responds to Juicy Campus Decision, THE GRAPHIC (Pepperdine U.), Feb. 7, 2008, available
at http://graphic.pepperdine.edu/perspectives/2008/2008-02-07-sga.htm; Lien Hoang, CCSC
Debates Possible Ban of Gossip Web Site, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR ONLINE EDITION, Mar. 3,
2008, http://www.columbiaspectator.com/2008/03/03/ccsc-debates-possible-ban-gossip-
web-site.
30 Canales, supra note 29 ("[O]n-campus Internet is a service provided by a private...
institution; therefore, the university reserves the right to limit the content that is viewed on
its grounds, in much the same way it limits its library's content .... ").
31 See id. (discussing Pepperdine's Student Government Association vote to ban Juicy-
Campus because of the threat it posed to the community); Michael Murphy, Juicy Campus
Blocked at Certain Campuses, MARQ. TRIB. (Marq. U.), Nov. 25, 2008, available at
http://media.www.marquettetribune.org/media/storage/paper1130/
news/2008/l 1/25/News/Juicy.Campus.Blocked.At.Certain.Campuses-3560432.shtml (re-
porting that Tennessee State University blocked access to JuicyCampus on its own network
and quoting an official as stating, "[i]t did not represent the environment we are in.").
32 Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, supra note 2; see Hoang, supra note 29.
33 Hoang, supra note 29. At a community meeting at Columbia University regarding the
sites, one student remarked, "'If I were a member of the gay male community, and I already
felt ostracized or uncomfortable with my orientation, I might be tempted to bring a gun to
school and shoot all of my fellow students' after seeing this [non-celebrity gossip] Web
site." Id. (quoting Jessica Aldridge, a Columbia University student).
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administrators and student government associations have taken action to block
access to these sites from campus networks. 4
Some commentators favor simply ignoring these gossip sites, rather than us-
ing university resources to restrict access and providing more free press for the
sites." The greatest concerns of students and advocates are free speech princi-
ples and the efficacy of a ban on the sites.36 In their view, the universities' con-
certed efforts towards censorship create a policy at odds with a traditional uni-
versity goal: facilitating the free flow of speech and ideas.37 Specifically, this
proposed censorship creates a dangerous precedent by allowing administrators
and student governments to protect their student bodies from content that they
find offensive or objectionable." Furthermore, some students doubt the effi-
cacy of any proposed ban on the gossip sites because restricting access on
campus does not prevent students from accessing the sites through off-campus
Internet service providers.39 Finally, at least one commentator argues that be-
cause these gossip Web sites have the "same factual accuracy as 'For a good
time call Andy' scrawled on a bathroom stall," they should be treated accord-
ingly by students, administrators, and potential employers.4"
These non-celebrity gossip Web sites have received a great deal of publicity
both on and off campus.4' As a result of the attention and the public outcry,
lawmakers and law enforcement officials are now working to shut them down
permanently.42 These "virtual bathroom walls"43 have drawn the ire of lawmak-
34 See, e.g., Canales, supra note 29 (reporting that the Pepperdine Student Government
Association voted to recommend a ban of JuicyCampus to the university's administration);
Hoang, supra note 29; Murphy, supra note 31 (reporting that Tennessee State University
banned JuicyCampus).
35 Lukianoff, supra note 15; see Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, supra note
2 (reporting that Austin Maness, drafter of the Pepperdine student government resolution,
suggested the resolution was a mistake because "it only increased students' awareness of
[the gossip Web sites]."). However, some students support the gossip sites. Hostin, supra
note 2 ("Thousands of students from across the country have written in to request that their
campus be added [to JuicyCampus]." (quoting a publicist for JuicyCampus)).
36 Hoang, supra note 29; Lukianoff, supra note 15.
31 See Hoang, supra note 29; Lukianoff, supra note 15.
38 See Hoang, supra note 29; Lukianoff, supra note 15.
39 See Neil Connolly, SGA Pushes Ban of Juicy Campus Web Site, W. COURIER (W. Ill.
U.), Dec. 12, 2008, http://media.www.westemcourier.com/media/storage/paper650/news/
2008/12/12/News/Sga-Pushes.Ban.Of.Juicy.Campus.Web.Site-3578806.shtml; Hoang, su-
pra note 29.
40 Lukianoff, supra note 15.
41 See, e.g., Kinzie, supra note 12; Hostin, supra note 2; McNiff & Varney, supra note
18; Canales, supra note 29.
42 See Heyboer, supra note 12 (explaining that in early 2008 the attorney general of
New Jersey subpoenaed the operators of JuicyCampus and that "[o]ther states ... have fol-
lowed New Jersey's lead and opened investigations into [JuicyCampus].").
43 Martha Neil, Prosecutor Explains Possible Case Against JuicyCampus, ABAJouR-
NAL.COM, May 19, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/prosecutor-explainspossible_
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ers and law enforcement officials, not for their possibly defamatory content,
but for potential violations of consumer protection laws,' as well as for not
following their own rules and standards set forth in their terms of service.45
After complaints of student harassment, the Attorneys General of both New
Jersey and Connecticut began investigating at least one of these Web sites-
JuicyCampus-for misrepresenting its terms of service to users by allowing
hateful, racist, and defamatory speech to be posted without any oversight or
removal." These two state investigations seem to be the beginning of a trend
caseagainstjuicycampus/ [hereinafter Neil, Possible Case Against JuicyCampus] (quoting
from 20/20 (ABC television broadcast May 16, 2008)).
44 Kinzie, supra note 12 ("Connecticut Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal, said ...
that his office is investigating JuicyCampus for possible consumer deception, fraud or mis-
leading statements." He said, "They said in their terms of service that they would not toler-
ate harassing, threatening messages, when in fact they certainly are doing so."); Chris Rizo,
AG Brown Asked to Investigate Campus Gossip Site, LEGALNEWSLINE.COM, Apr. 9, 2008,
http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/21063 1-ag-brown-asked-to-investigate-campus-gossip-
site.
45 Kinzie, supra note 12; Martha Neil, Another State AG Probes JuicyCampus Gossip
Website, ABAJOURNAL.COM, Mar. 25, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/another_
stateag_probesjuicycampusgossip website/ [hereinafter Neil, AG Probes JuicyCampus];
Neil, Possible Case Against JuicyCampus, supra note 43; cf JuicyCampus's User Conduct
Guidelines.
JUICYCAMPUS RESERVES THE RIGHT, BUT DISCLAIMS ANY OBLIGATION
OR RESPONSIBILITY, TO REMOVE ANY CONTENT THAT DOES NOT AD-
HERE TO THESE GUIDELINES, IN ITS SOLE DISCRETION.
You agree not to use the Site to:
(a) violate or solicit the violation of any applicable local, state, national or international
law. Among other things, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, you
agree not to post Content that is obscene or that violates laws relating to sexually ex-
plicit material, that infringes the rights of any third party (including intellectual prop-
erty and privacy or publicity rights), that is defamatory, or that constitutes hate speech
under applicable law....
JuicyCampus, Terms-Condition, http://www.juicycampus.com/posts/terms-condition (last
visited Feb. 11, 2009).
46 Neil, AG Probes JuicyCampus, supra note 45. Because JuicyCampus founder Matt
Ivester has closed down the site, the status of these investigations and other pending law-
suits against JuicyCampus is unclear. See Justin Pope, Juicy Campus, Home to Nasty School
Gossip Dries Up, ABCNEwS.coM, Feb. 5, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com.US.wirestory?id=
6812897; Posting of JuicyCampus to Official JuicyCampus Blog, Shutdown FAQs,
http://www.juicycampus.blogspot.com/2009/02/shutdown-faqs.html (Feb. 4, 2009, 11:41
EST) [hereinafter JuicyCampus Shutdown FAQs]. Posts to JuicyCampus are no longer
available, and JuicyCampus claims it will not release its posters Internet Protocol ad-
dresses-which can lead to the identification of the poster-without a "lawful subpoena."
JuicyCampus Shutdown FAQs, supra. JuicyCampus directs those wishing to find college
gossip to former competitor College ACB. Id. While perhaps the most well-known gossip
site no longer exists, Web site operators are wagering the desire for online, college-campus
gossip remains. Similar gossip Web sites are now being created to fill the void left by Jui-
cyCampus. See College ACB, supra note 2; College Trash Talk, http://www.
collegetrashtalk.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). The difference now is that these sites are
"juicer, nastier, naughtier, and much ... more sexier [sic] than the original .... " College
[Vol. 17
Gossip Immunity
among state officials.4
Are non-celebrity gossip Web sites worried about these investigations?
Hardly. JuicyCampus deemed these investigations "absurd, ' and site opera-
tors are quick to remind lawmakers of their CDA immunity from civil suits
arising from anonymous defamatory gossip.49 The Attorney General investiga-
tions have not yet resulted in criminal charges partially because of the immu-
nity Congress granted to providers of interactive computer services under the
CDA' °
However, operators' claims about their immunity under the CDA5' are insuf-
ficient to actually protect them; operators' conduct must be of the type specifi-
cally protected by the CDA.5 Site operators should reevaluate whether their
own actions regarding the operation of their Web sites makes them "responsi-
ble ... for the creation or development" of the content included on their sites
and therefore not beneficiaries of CDA immunity. 3 Moreover, in light of re-
cent legal decisions finding service providers were not immune from liability
for violating intellectual property laws-including state-created laws54--
operators should ascertain whether the content posted on their site could con-
stitute a violation of an individual's right of publicity.
Trash Talk, Where JuicyCampus Leaves Off, http://www.collegetrashtalk.com/index.php/
press (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
47 See Neil, AG Probes JuicyCampus, supra note 45 (noting that at least one California
lawmaker is calling for the California Attorney General to start an investigation into Juicy-
Campus).
48 Martha Neil, JuicyCampus on "Absurd" AG Probes: We Don't Have to Enforce Our
Rules, ABAJouRNALCOM, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/juicycampus_
on absurdag _probes we dont have to enforce our rules/ [hereinafter Neil, Absurd AG
Probes]; see JuicyCampus Shutdown FAQs, supra note 46 (affirming that JuicyCampus was
not shut down to legal trouble and that its "services and policies have always been well
within the law.").
49 E.g., The Dirty FAQ, supra note 27.
50 Neil, AG Probes JuicyCampus, supra note 45 (reporting that JuicyCampus is under
investigation); Heyboer, supra note 12 (reporting that the owners of JuicyCampus were
subpoenaed by the New Jersey Attorney General and explaining that JuicyCampus is pro-
tected by the CDA). Courts have determined that Web site operators are interactive com-
puters services for the purpose of immunity granted by the CDA. Universal Commc'n Sys.,
Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007).
51 E.g., The Dirty FAQ, supra note 27; The Dirty, Kochran Kardashian, supra note 26;
USAGoneDirty.com, Terms of Service, supra note 26.
52 See, e.g., Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142
1147-49 (D. Ariz. 2005) (explaining that the CDA only protects Web site operators if they
do not aide in creating the content); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000) (establishing that
providers of interactive computers services will not be treated as a publisher for "informa-
tion provided by another information content provider"-a third party).
53 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3).
54 See Doe v. Friendfinder Network Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d. 288, 299, 302-03 (D.N.H.
2008); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2)-(3).
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III. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 1996 AND ITS
EFFECTS ON NON-CELEBRITY GOSSIP WEB SITES
During the 1990s, while the Internet was a burgeoning form of communica-
tion, Congress sought to promote its use.5 Additionally, Congress attempted to
ease the Internet's transition from a form of media on the fringe of society to a
form that is generally available for the information, education, and entertain-
ment of all Americans. 6 Consistent with these goals, and to promote the over-
all development of the Internet, Congress enacted the Communications De-
cency Act of 1996."7 One of the law's goals is to foster and encourage the "vi-
brant and competitive free market" on the Internet"8 by immunizing Web site
operators from suit for the activities of third party posters. 9
A. Congressional Policy and Immunities Granted Under the CDA
Congress enacted the CDA in reaction, in part, to Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Services, Co. in 1995.60 Prodigy, a provider of an interactive computer
service, operated and maintained a financial discussion board where users
could post and discuss information relating to the financial markets.6 In 1994,
an anonymous user posted disparaging remarks about the business practices of
the plaintiff, Stratton Oakmont, an investment banking firm.62 Stratton Oak-
mont filed suit against Prodigy for libel.63 Ordinarily, a publisher of a defama-
tory comment is liable.' However, Prodigy claimed that it was a distributor,
not a publisher, and thus was not liable for defamation.6" Yet because Prodigy
55 See Communication Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509, §
230(a)(1), (3), 110 Stat. 56, 138 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230) (recognizing the
usefulness of the Internet and establishing policies in order to promote its growth and
achieve greater access for all Americans with as little governmental regulation as possible).
56 Id.
57 Id. § 230(b)(1).
58 Id. § 230(b)(2). See generally § 230(b) (establishing the other goals as promoting the
development of the Internet, encouraging the development of technologies that maximize
the Internet, empowering parents to restrict access to objectionable content, and ensuring
vigorous enforcement of federal obscenity, stalking, and harassment laws).
59 Id. § 230(c).
60 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995),
superseded by statute, Communication Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509,
§ 230, 110 Stat. 56; Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Con-
gress enacted § 230 [of the CDA] to remove the disincentives to selfregulation [sic] created
by the Stratton Oakmont decision.").
61 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 577 (1977).
65 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *3-4.
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had maintained some editorial control over its users' postings, such as the abil-
ity to delete postings, the court found that Prodigy was a publisher and there-
fore liable for content posted by third parties." The potential chilling effect of
this ruling was obvious: it left providers of interactive computer services with
the choice of either monitoring and editing posts by third parties and therefore
accepting some liability for the content of the postings, or not monitoring any
posts by third parties no matter how objectionable content, thereby avoiding
liability.
67
The CDA preempted the issue in Stratton Oakmont by immunizing from li-
ability providers of interactive computer services that self-regulate content.68
The CDA explicitly grants immunity to providers and users of interactive com-
puters services: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."69 If providers or users are not considered pub-
lishers, they cannot be liable for defamation.7" To that end, Congress recog-
nized that these computer service providers are in the best position to regulate
the content on the Internet and that providers should be encouraged to self-
regulate.7' Therefore, through this policy of encouraging self-regulation, Con-
gress sought to promote innovation of computer services through the elimina-
tion of a service provider's possible state tort liability arising from information
posted by third parties."
Despite the broad language of the CDA, the immunity granted to providers
of interactive computer services is not without limits. For instance, the statute
specifically reserves the application of intellectual property law" because of
66 Id. *4-5 ("[Prodigy]'s conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control, has
opened it up to a greater liability ....").
67 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Under [the Strat-
ton Oakmont] holding, computer service providers who regulated the dissemination of of-
fensive material on their services risked subjecting themselves to liability, because such
regulation cast the service provider in the role of a publisher.").
68 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 ("The specter of tort liability in an
area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible
for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems....
In this respect, § 230 responded to... Stratton Oakmont .....
69 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558.
71 Adam M. Greenfield, Despite a Perfect 10, What Newspapers Should Know About
Immunity (and Liability) for Online Commenting, 4 U/S: J.L. & POL'Y INFO. Soc'Y 453,461-
62 (2008). However, despite the broad immunity granted to providers of interactive com-
puter services, the CDA does not remove liability from the actual information content pro-
vider, who is generally the anonymous third party whose content instigated the lawsuit.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 ("None of [the language in the CDA] means, of course, that the
original culpable party who posts defamatory messages would escape accountability.").
72 Greenfield, supra note 71, at 461-62.
73 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
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the ease with which intellectual property laws could be subverted through the
use of the Internet.74
The broad language of the CDA has led to difficult interpretation and appli-
cation by the courts, often forcing them to draw the line between behavior con-
stituting responsible "creat[ion] or develop[ment]" of content on the part of
service providers and irresponsible behavior of a "creat[or] or develop[er]"
resulting in liability.75
B. Judicial Interpretation of the CDA
Congress enacted the CDA in order to foster "diversity of political dis-
course, . . . cultural development, and . . . intellectual activity" available to
Americans through the Internet "with a minimum . . . government regula-
tion."76 Since enactment, courts have been receptive to the broad, sweeping
immunity that Congress granted to providers of interactive computer services."
Litigation serves to define and refine certain aspects of the CDA and to distin-
guish those activities that are protected from those that are not.78 Aside from
affirming the CDA, courts have distinguished applicability between informa-
tion content providers and providers of communications services, as well as
affirmed that the CDA has no effect on intellectual property law.
1. Recognition and Reaffirmation of the CDA 's Broad Immunity
Actions in which the defendant claims the CDA as a defense often involve
the plaintiff attempting to hold the defendant, typically a provider of an inter-
active computer service, liable for defamatory or harassing speech provided by
a third party.79 A defendant service provider is immune from liability under the
CDA "if: (1) [the defendant] is a provider or user of an interactive computer
service; (2) the claim is based on information provided by another information
74 See generally Dale M. Cendali, Charlotte E. Forssander & Ronald J. Turiello, Jr., An
Overview of Intellectual Property Issues Relating to the Internet, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 485,
485-92 (1999) (discussing ways the Internet has contributed to increased infringement of
intellectual property laws).
75 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f)(3); see infra Part III.B.2 (examining when interactive com-
puter service providers' conduct exposes them to liability although normally they would be
immune under the CDA).
76 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3)-(4).
77 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding interactive
computers service provider America Online immune under the CDA for suit for defama-
tion); Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 414-15 (1st Cir. 2007)
(reaffirming Zeran); infra Part III.B. 1.
78 See infra Part III.B.2.
79 See, e.g., Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc., 478 F.3d at 414-15; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328.
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content provider; and (3) the claim would treat [the defendant] as the publisher
or speaker of that information.""° When a court determines that all three of the
elements have been satisfied, the defendant is immune under the CDA from
defamation suits spurred by the postings of third parties."'
In an early case involving the CDA, Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the de-
fendant invoked the CDA as an affirmative defense to a defamation claim. 2
Zeran's claim arose when an anonymous America Online ("AOL") user posted
false statements to an online message board, leading to severe harassment of
Zeran. 3 Zeran sued AOL, claiming AOL was liable as the publisher of defama-
tory, third-party content. 4
On an appeal from the grant of summary judgment by a U.S. district court,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the CDA protected AOL
because it was a provider of interactive computer services. 5 The court deter-
mined that this scenario was the quintessential situation that Congress envi-
sioned when enacting the CDA's immunity provision and dismissed Zeran's
claim. 6 The court reaffirmed Congress's recognition that if interactive com-
puter service providers were forced to restrict or eliminate speech to avoid li-
ability, it would create an "obvious chilling effect" on speech.87 The court
noted the concems of free speech outweigh the imposition of state tort liability
80 Universal Commc 'n Sys., Inc., 478 F.3d at 418; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
81 See id at 418-22 (finding that all three elements were met, and therefore CDA im-
munity applied); see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 n.6, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Roommates.com
was not entitled to immunity because it provided content "in part," despite being an interac-
tive computer service provider); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328-30 (conclud-
ing that CDA immunity applied because AOL was an interactive computer service provider,
the defaming content was provided by a third party, and America Online was being treated
as a publisher of the information); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288,
294-95, 298 (D.N.H. 2008) (concluding that state-law privacy actions were barred by the
CDA because the plaintiff was "seek[ing] to hold the defendants liable as the publisher ...
of information provided by another content provider"); Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbu-
reau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1148-49 (D. Ariz. 2005) (declining to dismiss a
claim based on CDA immunity because the defendants had not addressed issues concerning
whether they had helped to create or develop the information content).
82 Zeran, 129 F.3d. at 329.
83 Id. The anonymous user posted a message that offered "offensive and tasteless" t-
shirts regarding the domestic terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Id. Zeran's home phone number was listed as the contact num-
ber for the t-shirts, which led to Zeran receiving "a high volume of calls, comprised primar-
ily of angry and derogatory messages, but also including death threats." Id
84 Id. at 329-30.
85 See id. at 328, 330-35 & n.2.
86 Id. at 330-35 (explaining Congress enacted the CDA to respond to Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. and that the case at bar was similar to Stratton Oakmont).
87 See id. at 331 (calling speech transmitted via interactive computer service "stagger-
ing" and "prolific").
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on providers of interactive computer services."
More recently, in Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., the
First Circuit 9 affirmed that the definition of "provider of an interactive com-
puter service" includes service providers who do not directly connect their us-
ers to the Internet.9" Unlike AOL in Zeran, Lycos did not provide users with
access to the Internet-it merely operated a series of Web sites.' Narrowing
the limitation to include only interactive computer service providers who pro-
vide Internet access would undermine the Congressional intent and policy un-
derlying the CDA.92 As established, Congress wanted to encourage self-
policing by interactive computer service providers.93
Other unclear definitions in the CDA have led courts to reevaluate the mean-
ing of otherwise familiar words.94 Most notably, courts have had opportunity to
decide what behavior changes a service provider's status from a mere provider
of an interactive computer service to a provider of information content.95 These
cases hinged on the meaning of "responsible, in whole or in part, for the crea-
tion or development of information."96
88 Id. ("Congress considered the weight of the speech interests ... and chose to immu-
nize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.").
89 In both cases the plaintiffs sought to hold an Internet service provider liable for third
party defamatory content posted anonymously on online bulletin boards operated by the
defendant Internet service provider. See id. at 414-16; Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d
327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997).
90 See Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419-22 (1st Cir.
2007), 478 F.3d at 419-22 ("Providing access to the Internet is, however, not the only way
to be an interactive computer service provider. While such providers are specifically in-
cluded [by the language of the CDA], there is no indication that the definition should be so
limited.").
91 Id. at 419.
92 Id. at418-19.
93 See discussion supra Part III.A (examining the intent of congress in enacting the
CDA).
94 See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1162-63, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008) (interpreting both "responsible" and "in part" as
used in the CDA); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.N.H.
2008) (discussing the proper interpretation of the word "any" as used in the CDA § (e)(2)).
95 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)-(3); see, e.g., Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162-63, 1164-67
(finding a Web site can be both a content provider and an interactive service provider if it
helps to create the information); Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (finding slight
modifications or editorial control does not make a Web site a content provider); Hy Cite
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1148-49 (indicating that too much editorial control and solicita-
tion of posts may turn a Web site into a content provider). A provider of an "interactive
computer service" is one who furnishes "any information service [or] system ... that pro-
vides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server." An "information
content provider" is "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interac-
tive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)-(3).
96 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162-63, 1167; Friendfinder
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2. Distinguishing Between "Provider of an Interactive Computer Service" and
"Information Content Provider"
The First Circuit noted in Universal Communications, Inc. that "[n]o
amount of artful pleading can avoid" the fact that Congress intended to immu-
nize message board operators from liability resulting from posts made by oth-
ers, not to immunize online publishers from liability for publishing defamatory
content. 7 To overcome a defendant's use of the CDA as an affirmative de-
fense, plaintiffs will often try to categorize the defendant, not as the immune
"provider of an interactive computer service," but as the potentially liable "in-
formation content provider."98 Thus, the courts had to decide what level of ac-
tivity transforms a provider of an interactive computer service from a conduit
for information into a creator or developer of content.99
Courts have made it clear that the mere selection of information for removal
or publication on a Web site is not sufficient to convert an interactive computer
service provider into a creator or developer of information content;' ° it takes
"something more substantial" than exerting minimal editorial control over the
content.'' This result makes sense, as Congress intended to encourage interac-
tive service providers to self-police'° 2-an activity that requires some level of
control over the information provided by third parties through the service.
However, where a service provider supplements a user's posts with content or
takes affirmative steps to induce its users to post content, a court will view that
provider as both an interactive service provider and a provider of information
content, making the provider liable for tort claims arising from that content.' 3
In Batzel v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit had to decide whether a Web site opera-
tor's minor alterations to a third party's content prior to publication constituted
Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
97 Universal Commc'n Sys., 478 F.3d at 418, 419-20.
98 See, e.g., Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162, 1164-66; Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d
1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th
Cir. 2003).
99 See Chicago Lawyers' Comm'n for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419-20 (5th
Cir. 2008); Universal Commc'n Sys., 478 F.3d at 419-21; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030-32;
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124-25.
100 See, e.g., Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031; see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
331 (4th Cir. 1997) (arguing that Congressional intent in enacting the CDA was to immu-
nize interactive service providers from suit for "the exercise of its editorial ... function[]").
101 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.
102 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b), (c)(2) (2000); supra Part III.A (discussing the intent of Con-
gress in enacting the CDA and its goal of encouraging self-regulation by interactive service
providers).
103 See Roommates.corn, 521 F.3d 1163-65 (finding that a Web site that required users to
make selections from options generated by the Web site operator was an information con-
tent provider).
20091
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
"creation or development of information" under the CDA.' ° In this case, the
defendant published portions of a third party's allegedly defamatory e-mail on
his Web site.'0 5 The plaintiff, Batzel, discovered the published e-mail and filed
suit for damage to her reputation and loss of business, resulting from its publi-
cation.' 6 A co-defendant, who was responsible for posting the allegedly de-
famatory material on the Internet, asserted the CDA as an affirmative de-
fense."0 7 The court found that the defendant may be immune under the CDA
because "[t]he 'development of information' . . . means something more sub-
stantial than merely editing portions of an e-mail and selecting material for
publication.""8 This holding encourages more self-regulation on the part of
interactive service providers by granting them immunity when they choose
content for publication based on a policy of "inclusion or removal," even per-
mitting minor content edits.
Similarly, questionnaires that many Web sites require users to complete to
use the Web site's services also have led to definitional issues." Question-
naires are often used in creation of an online profile. Typically, profiles created
for social networking"' and online auction"2 Web sites where the information
104 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.
1o5 See id. at 1021-22.
106 Id. at 1022-23.
107 Id. at 1021, 1026, 1030. The defendant, Cremers, sought protection from suit under
California's anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation) law, which pro-
tects citizens from lawsuits brought to deter the proper exercise of legal or political rights.
Id. at 1023-24. However, the court looked to the CDA to determine if the defense could be
successful. Id. at 1026.
108 Id. at 1031. In a footnote, the court acknowledged that other courts have agreed with
its finding that more than editorial decisions are required to constitute "development of in-
formation" under the CDA. Id. at 1031 n.18.
109 Id. at 1032 ("The scope of the immunity cannot turn on whether the publisher ap-
proaches the selection process as one of inclusion or removal .... Congress could not have
meant to favor removal of offending material over more advanced software that screens out
the material before it ever appears.").
110 See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing a suit against Roommates.com for helping
users "discriminate" by requiring them to complete a series of questions); Carafano v. Met-
rosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing an action against the
owners of Matchmaker.com for the creation of a fake profile, which was created by filling
out a series of recommended questions); see also Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 415-
417 (discussing plaintiffs attempt to hold MySpace liable because it was partially responsi-
ble for the content transmitted between two individuals).
I A social networking Web site is defined as "[a] Web site that provides a virtual com-
munity for people interested in a particular subject or just to 'hang out' together. Members
create their own online 'profile' with biographical data ...." PC Magazine, Encyclopedia,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/ (search for "social networking site") (last visited Jan.
28, 2009) Examples include MySpace and Facebook. Id.
112 An online auction Web site is defined as one that uses "the Web to match buyers and
sellers around the globe." Id. (search for "online auction"). Examples include eBay, Ama-
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collected is used to tailor the Web site to the user's specific interests or
needs."' Courts have dealt with several cases where the plaintiffs attempt to
categorize the Web site owners and operators as "creators or developers" of the
information contained within online profiles, which would make the owners or
operators liable for the information within the user's profile."4 Courts have
also recognized the infeasibility of forcing online service providers to monitor
any and all posts on their Web sites prior to publishing the posts."5 Such a re-
quirement likely would result in many sites shutting down or never being cre-
ated, which would be inconsistent with the purpose of the CDA because it
would inhibit the exchange of information over the Internet."6
In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., the plaintiff, a television actress, tried
to sue the operators of a dating Web site for allowing an anonymous user to
create a profile using her address and phone number, as well as photos of her
taken from elsewhere on the Internet."7 The profile resulted in the plaintiff re-
ceiving harassing, threatening, and sexually explicit messages online, by
phone, and by mail from users of the Web site."' Shortly thereafter, the plain-
tiff filed suit against the Web site operators."9 On appeal, 2 ° the Ninth Circuit
held that although the defendant's Web site provided a questionnaire, 2' the
content contained within the profile was a direct result of the user's responses
to the questionnaire.'22 The court reasoned that, consistent with the language of
section 230 and its underlying policies, "so long as a third party willingly pro-
zon.com, and priceline.com. Id.
113 See, e.g., Roommates.corn, 521 F.3d at 1161-62 (discussing how Roommates.com
requires users to fill out a series of questions in order to help them find a compatible room-
mate); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121 (describing how Matchmaker.com requires users to fill
out a detailed questionnaire and answer other questions to create a profile).
114 See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers' Comm'n for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (seeking to hold an online classified Web site liable
for discriminatory housing listings posted by users); MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 416 (seek-
ing to hold a social networking site liable for allowing adults seeking sex to communicate
with minors); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1120-22 (seeking to hold an online dating Web site
liable for allowing users to create a false profile of an actress).
115 See Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d at 668-69; see also Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124-25.
116 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2000).
17 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121-22.
118 Id.
"19 Id. at 1122.
120 At trial, the District Court for the Central District of California found that the defen-
dant service provider was not immune under the CDA because "the company provided part
of the profile content," thus becoming an information content provider. Id. However, the
court dismissed the claim on other grounds, resulting in the plaintiff's appeal. Id
121 Id. at 1121. The questionnaire contained numerous multiple choice and essay ques-
tions ranging from the "innocuous" to the "sexually suggestive." Id.
122 Id. at 1124 (noting that the "selection of the content was left exclusively to the user"
and that the defendant "was not responsible, even in part, for associating certain multiple
choice responses").
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vides the essential published content, the interactive service provider receives
full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process"'23 because
any profile on the Web site lacks content until a third party completes the ques-
tionnaire provided.'24 Additionally, the Web site operators had nothing to do
with essays, answers, and photographs provided by third parties as part of the
profile-making process.'25 The court also noted that "[w]ithout standardized,
easily encoded answers," the Web site might not be able to offer the same de-
gree of customer service and reasoned that allowing the site to operate with
these tools furthered the goal of the CDA.'26
In the aforementioned cases, the courts noted that an interactive service pro-
vider is not liable for information willingly provided by a third party.'27 Based
on this reasoning, it is logical to assume that a provider would be immune from
liability for third-party users who complete questionnaires on their Web sites,
which result in the commission of an illegal act. However, service provider
liability regarding questionnaires turns on whether the provider required users
to commit the illegal act. That was the central issue in Fair Housing Council of
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC.
28
In order to provide more compatible matches, the Roommates.com Web
site"'29 required its users to complete a lengthy online questionnaire in order to
create a profile. 3 ' In addition to requiring standard information, such as name
and e-mail address, Roommates.com required users to "disclose [their] sex,
sexual orientation, and whether [they] would bring children to the house-
hold." '' The site also provided users with an "Additional Comments" section
that solicits any additional information from the users that they think would be
useful in matching them with another user. 3 2 All of this information was then
compiled and displayed on the user's profile page.'33 The Fair Housing Council
of San Fernando Valley initiated a suit against Roommate.com, LLC ("Room-
mate"), alleging that the Web site operators violated federal and state antidis-
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1125.
127 See id at 1124.
128 521 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008).
129 The business entity uses the singular "Roommate.com," but the Web site uses the
plural "www.roommates.com." Id. at 1161 n.2. Roommates.com provides roommate-
matching services, pairing those seeking to rent out spare rooms with those who have rooms
to rent. Id. at 1161.
130 Id. at 1161-62.131 Id. at 116 1.
132 Id.
133 Id at 1165. The profiles display the user's sex, sexual orientation, and most other
information that the user supplied when creating his or her profile. Id. Users seeking a
roommate could search the profiles based on those criteria. Id.
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crimination housing laws by allowing users to limit their housing search based
on discriminatory fields such as sex or familial status.'34
While the Ninth Circuit noted that Roommate's users may supply informa-
tion to complete their user profiles, the court stated that "the fact that users are
information content providers does not preclude Roommate from also being an
information content provider by helping 'develop' at least 'in part' the infor-
mation in the profiles."' 35 The court held that because Roommate created the
questions and required users to answer them to use the site, Roommate became
a developer of the profile.'36 The court further found that Web site's question-
naire and search capability rose beyond that of "neutral tools" because the
search method available on the site was not based on "user-defined criteria,"
but was in fact based on illegal search criteria.'37 Thus, the court found that the
site's questionnaire, search engine, and e-mail alerts constituted conduct out-
side the scope of the CDA's immunity for interactive service providers.'38
The court did, however, note that the site's operators retained CDA immu-
nity for information provided in the "Additional Comments" section of the
questionnaire, even though subscribers may have entered discriminatory com-
ments."' This distinction between the two sections of Roommate's Web site is
important because it underscores the Ninth Circuit's message to interactive
computer service providers: "If you don't encourage illegal content, or design
your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune.
14
0
Requiring users to input illegal content is not the only way that a service
provider can be transformed into a content provider. Inducing users to provide
content for a site with promises of compensation can make the site's operator
"responsible ... for the creation or development" of the user-provided content
134 Id. at 1162 &n.4, 1169-70.
13 5 Id. at 1165.
136 Id. at 1165-67. The court also found that Roommate was the "'information content
provider' as to the questions and can claim no immunity for posting them on its website" Id.
at 1164.
137 Id. at 1169 (analogizing Roommate's behavior to non-online illegal housing prac-
tices).
This is no different from a real estate broker in real life saying, "Tell me whether
you're Jewish or you can find yourself another broker." When a business enterprise ex-
tracts such information from potential customers as a condition of accepting them ..
the enterprise is responsible ... for developing that information.
Id. at 1166.
138 See id. at 1166, 1172.
139 Id. at 1173-74; accord Chicago Lawyers' Comm'n for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc.
v. Craigslist, Inc. 519 F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that Craigslist was im-
mune under the CDA because it provided users with neutral tools and that nothing in its
service "induces anyone to... express a preference for discrimination").
140 Roommates.corn, 521 F.3d at 1175.
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and liable for it as well. 4 In Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C.,
the Arizona District court grappled with this very issue.'42
Under the guise of consumer advocacy, the defendants created badbusiness-
bureau.com that allowed consumers to air their grievances about companies or
individuals.'43 The creators of badbusinessbureau.com asked consumers to post
"Rip-off Reports,"'" and offered the possibility of compensation for those
"Rip-off Reporters" who contributed honest, quality reports over a period of
time.' 5 In addition to publishing the complaints of its users, the Web site op-
erators also "produce[d] editorials and create[d] titles to the Rip-off Reports
posted by users."'46
After reviewing several reports on badbusinessbureau.com, the plaintiff, Hy
Cite Corporation, filed suit against the Web site, alleging defamation among
other counts.'47 The defendant operators asserted the CDA as an affirmative
defense, making the central issue whether the defendant's activity rose to the
level of becoming a developer or creator of the alleged defamatory content.4
The court held on summary judgment that the defendant's publishing of
"original content" within the Rip-off Reports, including the comments and ti-
tles for the reports, coupled with promises of future compensation for its re-
porters made the Web site operators responsible for the creation or develop-
ment of information.'49 Therefore, the operators were not immune under the
CDA.150
Assuming that these cases are consistently decided, the courts have struck a
very fine line between qualifying for immunity under the CDA and being li-
able for defamatory content.
Congress intended to treat the Internet differently from traditional forms of
communication such as newspapers, radio, and television.'' Under the CDA,
41 See Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1145,
1149 (D. Ariz. 2005).
142 Id. at 1148-49. The Hy Cite Corp. opinion was a ruling on the propriety of a motion
to dismiss. Id. at 1147.
143 Id. at 1145. The defendants' Web site describes itself as a vehicle for consumers to
file complaints and reports about business that have "rip[ped] off consumers." Id.
'44 "Rip-off Reports" detailed the user's complaint against a company or individual. Id.
145 The court explained that "Rip-off Reporters" are those who investigated businesses
and were encouraged to contact the site operators for tips and advice. Id. Once the "reporter"
has demonstrated a level of quality work over a period of time, the defendants considered
the user for compensation. Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1145-46.
148 Id. at 1147-49.
149 1d. at 1149.
150 Id.
151 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998).
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providers of interactive computer services are granted immunity for informa-
tion published by them, but created or developed by a third party.'52 However,
"[t]he Communications Decency Act was not meant to create a lawless no-
man's-land on the Internet.""' As established above, Web site operators may
lose immunity if they are responsible for the creation or development of con-
tent on their sites. Additionally, interactive computer service providers also
may be liable for infringing on the intellectual property of others.154
3. The CDA Does Not Immunize Service Providers for Violations of
Intellectual Property Laws
A recent and pertinent example of the effect of the misappropriation of intel-
lectual property and its effect on CDA immunity is the case of Doe v. Friend-
finder Network, Inc.'55 In this case, the plaintiff discovered an unauthorized,
unwanted, and sexually explicit profile, containing her information as well as a
nude photograph that resembled her posted by an anonymous user of the de-
fendant's Web sites.'56 Upon this discovery, the plaintiff contacted the defen-
dant, Friendfinder Network, Inc. ("Friendfinder"), who then removed the pro-
file.'57 However, despite the removal of the profile from the Web site itself,
slightly altered portions of the profile-including the photograph-surfaced
through the Internet on unaffiliated sites in the form of advertisements known
as "teasers."'58 Due to the continued pervasiveness of the Internet ads, the
plaintiff filed suit alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and dam-
age to her reputation, seeking both monetary and injunctive relief.'59 The de-
152 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000); Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc. 478 F.3d
413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir.
2003); see also Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1026-29.
153 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 2008).
154 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288,
299 (D.N.H. 2008).
155 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008).
156 Id. at 292. Friendfinder Network, Inc. operated several Web sites, including Adult-
FriendFinder.com, a site where members can complete profiles in order to meet other mem-
bers interested in sex and swinging. Id. at 291. The profile using plaintiffs information
sought "Men or Women for Erotic ChatiE-mail/Phone Fantasies and Discreet Relationship."
Id. at 292.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 291-293. The modifications were minor and generally involved just a change in
the plaintiffs age. Id. at 292 n.3. The teaser advertisements posted on unrelated Web sites
directed Internet traffic, through hyperlinks, to one of the defendant's Web sites. Id. at 293.
The court notes that by directing traffic to the defendant's Web sites, the teaser allegedly
increased Friendfinder's profitability. Id.
159 See id. at 293. With regard to the injunctive relief, the plaintiff sought an injunction
"requiring the defendants to notify the public of the circumstances giving rise to the appear-
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fendant sought to dismiss the claims under CDA 6 °
In analyzing the defendant's claim, the New Hampshire District Court found
that the CDA barred the plaintiffs state law claims for defamation.6 Due to
the CDA immunity, the court dismissed the plaintiffs claims of defamation
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.'62 However, the court shrewdly
noted that the plaintiff had a claim for a violation of her right of publicity,'63 a
state-created intellectual property right, which according to this court was left
unaffected by the CDA.' 4 Therefore, the court refused to grant the defendant's
motion to dismiss the plaintiff's right of publicity claim.'65
Importantly, this holding affirmed that computer service providers may be
liable for misappropriation of intellectual property rights under state law. Spe-
cifically, interactive computer service providers might be held liable if they or
their users violate an individual's right of publicity by profiting from the plain-
tiff's image or likeness. Applying this reasoning to non-celebrity gossip Web
sites, operators could be held liable if the plaintiff establishes a link between
use of the individual's likeness and profit of the Web site. Operators should
review the content posted to their Web site to verify that it is not used in com-
merce and therefore violative of the right of publicity. If the targeted individu-
als can be identified from the information listed about them on the Web site,
and the content is used for a commercial purpose, the plaintiff likely will have
a valid claim against the gossip Web site operators for violating their rights of
publicity. This holding begs the question whether Congress intended the CDA
to immunized Web site operators from such claims.
ance of the profile on their websites." Id.
160 Id. at 291.
161 See id at 293-98 (holding that Friendfinder's encouragement of anonymous postings
and a questionnaire comprised of a "pre-set menu of sexual responses" did not put Friend-
finder outside the immunity typically granted to interactive computer service providers by
the CDA).
162 Id. at 306-07.
163 Id. at 302-04. The defendants in this case took issue that the plaintiff had not stated a
claim for violation of her right of publicity, but the court was unmoved by their argument.
Id. at 303-04 & n.16.
164 See id. at 299-300 (noting that if Congress intended for the CDA to preempt state-
created intellectual property laws, but not federal ones, they would have used the word "fed-
eral" in 47 U.S.C. § 230 (e)(1) instead of the word "any"). Contra Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiIl,
LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that the CDA immunized service
providers from state intellectual property claims).
Because material on a website may be viewed across the Interet, and thus in more
than one state at a time, permitting the reach of any particular state's definition of intel-
lectual property to dictate the contours of this federal immunity[, which] would be con-
trary to Congress's expressed goal of insulating the development of the Internet from
the various state-law regimes.
Id. at 1118.
165 Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 306-07.
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C. Potential Liability under State Tort Law for Non-celebrity Gossip Web Site
Operators
Among the goals of the CDA's immunity provisions are to allow parents to
protect their children from "inappropriate online material"'66 and to "deter and
punish ... obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer."'67 De-
spite these goals, some Web site operators-including operators of non-
celebrity gossip Web sites-are using this immunity to circumvent the under-
lying Congressional intent, allowing hateful and harassing speech to flourish
on their Web sites with little or no oversight.'68 These Web site operators gen-
erally do not edit or modify the content posted by their users and avoid tradi-
tional state tort liability for defamation under the CDA's broad immunity.
However, despite their claims of immunity under the CDA, the editorial com-
ments provided by some of these operators may cause the Web site to cross the
line from providers of an "interactive computer service" to providers of "in-
formation content," putting the Web site operator outside the scope of immu-
nity under the CDA' 69
A Web site operator is immune from a claim under state tort law if: the de-
fendant "is a provider or user of an interactive computer service"; and "the
claim is based on information provided by another information content pro-
vider."' 0 Generally, non-celebrity gossip Web sites meet the definition of a
provider of an interactive computer service. The definition is broad and in-
cludes online message boards; "' non-celebrity gossip sites are online forums
that are analogous to message boards.' Therefore, unless a potential plaintiff
166 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2000).
167 Id. § 230(b)(5).
168 See, e.g., The Dirty, Kochran Kardashian, supra note 26. ("In this situation, because
[the Dirty] is an 'interactive website', even if a user were to post a defamatory comment
about you, [the Dirty] is entirely immune from any lawsuit based on those comments be-
cause of a federal law called the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230.")
169 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f(2)-(3); Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C.,
418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (D. Ariz. 2005).
170 Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007).
171 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (defining an interactive computer service provider as one "that
providers or enables computer access by multiple users to a computers service, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet."); see Universal
Commc 'n Sys., 478 F.3d at 419 (extending the definition of a "provider of an interactive
computer service" to include those providers who do not grant its users access to the Inter-
net, but merely operate Web sites); Batzel v. Smith, 33 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003)
(reasoning "interactive computer service" is more than just providers of access to the Inter-
net and the CDA extends immunity to "users" of a service); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com,
339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that most courts have adopted "a relatively
expansive definition of 'interactive computer service."').
172 Online forums that are "discussion group[s] on the Web about a particular topic." PC
Magazine, supra note Ill (search for "forum"). Forums include posts by individual users,
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can prove that the defendant has created or developed at least some portion of
the information comprising the basis of the claim, the plaintiffs state tort claim
is barred by the immunity granted under the CDA.
173
A potential plaintiff against a non-celebrity gossip Web site would have to
determine whether the information was "provided by another.' 74 If the Web
site operator is considered to be the provider of the content, the CDA immunity
does not apply. 7 '
The plaintiff must demonstrate that the service provider's actions rise to the
level of creation or development of content, which would make the service
provider an information content provider and liable for any defamatory infor-
mation content. 76 However, there is no bright-line test for what action changes
a provider of an interactive computer service into an information content pro-
vider.77 Nonetheless, courts have held that supplementing and editing the third
party content beyond "minor edits"'78 and inducing users to provide informa-
tion with promises of future compensation'79 are actions outside the scope of
CDA immunity. Because the operators of non-celebrity gossip Web sites edit
and monitor content to varying degrees, their potential liability varies accord-
ingly. Applied to three different non-celebrity gossip Web sites, this premise
yields different results.
as well as "all the extras people expect from Web pages, including images, videos and
downloads." 1d. Non-celebrity gossip Web sites invite users to post gossip and allow other
users to post replies or comment on the original post, operating in the same manner as a
standard online message board. See, e.g., College ACB, supra note 2; The Dirty, supra note
21.
173 See Hy Cite Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 (holding that dismissal was inappropriate
because of the possibility that the Web site operator contributed enough to be an information
content provider).
174 See Universal Commc 'n Sys., 478 F.3d at 418.
17 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 ("Under the statutory
scheme, an 'interactive computer service' qualifies for immunity so long as it does not also
function as an 'information content provider'...."); see also Universal Commc 'n Sys., 478
F.3d at 418 (noting that defendant interactive computer service providers are immunized
from a state law claim when the information giving rise to the claims is "provided by an-
other information content provider").
176 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1172-74 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding the operators of Roommates.com liable for content
that they assisted in creating and immune for content they did not create or assist in creat-
ing).
177 See id. (McKeown, J. dissenting). One can be both a "provider of an interactive com-
puter service" and an "information content provider" simultaneously. See id. at 1162 (major-
ity opinion).
178 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003); cf Hy Cite Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 2d at 1149 (finding that editorial comments, titles, original content, and inducements
for content by a Web site operator might be enough to convert the operator into a creator or
developer of content).
179 Hy Cite Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1149.
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College ACB 8° allows users to submit gossip about their classmates anony-
mously.'"' Users post gossip on the site and other users are allowed to view,
reply, vote for, or comment on the original post.'82 The site operator does not
edit the posts nor does it promise to monitor the postings actively. 3 However,
College ACB encourages its users to report any posts that are objectionable or
violate its terms of use-the operators may then delete the post.' Thus, the
College ACB operator's inaction renders the site a mere conduit for the cam-
pus gossipers to post their information.
Courts have held that a service provider's monitoring or lack of monitoring
of information posted by third parties does not make the service provider an
"information content provider."'8 5 It follows, then, that College ACB likely
would not be held as an information content provider and that claims against
College ACB would likely be based on information provided by one of its us-
ers, another information provider. Therefore, College ACB and similar sites
likely would be protected by the CDA from tort liability in state law arising
from its users' postings.
By contrast, a gossip site whose operators supplement its users' postings
with their own content may face potential liability because such action could
render the operators as creators or developers of the content. 6 To constitute
180 College ACB has replaced JuicyCampus as the most prominent college gossip site
since JuicyCampus ceased operations for financial reasons. See A Juicy Shutdown, supra
note 12; JuicyCampus Shutdown FAQs, supra note 46. College ACB "is quickly becoming
the central hub of college campuses around the country, giving students the freedom to
voice their opinion, ask questions and ask questions about any facet of college life." Posting
of College ACB to Official Blog for CollegeACB.com, College ACB Press Release,
http://collegeacb.blogspot.com/2009/02/collegeacb-pressrelease.html (Feb. 5, 2009 12:57
EST) [hereinafter College ACB Press Release].
181 College ACB FAQ, supra note 4 (explaining College ACB "stands for College
Anonymous Confession Board. It's a forum open to discuss almost any topic with other
members of the campus community.").
182 See College ACB, General ACB, http://www.collegeacb.com/sb.php?school=general
(last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
183 College ACB, Terms of Use,
http://www.collegeacb.com/sb.php?school=general&page=terms (last visited Feb. 22, 2009)
The operator states "it is impossible for [the operator] to review messages" and although the
operator has the ability to remove "objectionable messages," the operator will only do so
after it has "determine[d] that removal is necessary." Id. The site further reminds users that
it is "not responsible for the contents of any message." Id.
184 Id.; see also College ACB FAQ, supra note 4; College ACB Press Release, supra
note 180 (noting that College ACB utilizes a "user-moderation button" allowing for a level
of self-regulation by users and the operator that was not available on sites like JuicyCam-
pus).
185 See Universal Commc'n Sys. Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007);
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-25 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Amer-
ica Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
186 Compare Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (deciding to find the
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"development of information" under the CDA, the operator must do something
"more substantial than merely editing portions of [the content] and selecting
material for publication."'87
The operator of the Dirty,'88 Nik Richie, may be considered an "information
content provider" and an "information service provider" because of the origi-
nal content that he adds to users' gossip postings. Nik Richie allows users to
post gossip and photographs on his Web site.'89 However, unlike College ACB,
Richie-self-described as "the first ever reality blogger"''9  not only serves as
a conduit for the information, but also often provides editorial comments be-
neath the user-provided photograph and gossip. 9' Further, Richie's editorial
comments are distinguishable from the slight edits at issue in Batzel v. Smith
because Richie does more than "select and make minor alterations" to his us-
ers' information; he adds entirely new, original content. 92
Richie's activity more closely resembles the editorial comments added by
the Web site operator in Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C.'93 In
Hy Cite, the court found that where the defendant Web site operator adds its
own original content to third-party posts, the Web site operator may be an in-
formation content provider.'94 Like the defendant in Hy Cite, Nik Richie may
be an "information content provider" because he adds his own editorial com-
ments to third-party provided content. Because the content is not created by
another, but by Richie himself, he may not receive CDA immunity for his
comments and, thus, may expose himself to potential tort liability for claims
based on the content that he provides.
Promises of future compensation to users can also verge on "development"
of information, exposing site operators to liability for the user-created con-
tent.'95 The operators of the non-celebrity gossip Web site, Gossip Report,'96
Web site operator an information content provider because it only made minor edits), with
Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (D. Ariz.
2005) (finding that the CDA may not apply to a Web site operator because the operators
contributed to the content, including adding titles to user generated posts, generating some
content in the posts, and allegedly soliciting individuals to submit posts for compensation).
187 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.
188 The Dirty is a non-celebrity gossip Web site whose users can post photographs with
captions that they upload themselves and categorize their gossip by city or college campus.
The Dirty, supra note 21.
189 Dirty Submit, http://www.thedirty.com/?pageid=32876 (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
190 The Dirty, supra note 21.
'91 See, e.g., Club Thrust, supra note 25 (displaying the comment of Richie, "Let me
guess... not out of the closets yet. -nik" under a user posted photograph of men in sleeveless
shirts and cowboy hats).
192 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.
193 Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1145-46 (D.
Ariz. 2005).
194 Id. at 1149.
195 Id.
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may also not qualify for CDA immunity due to the prospect of compensation
for users of the site, Gossip Report promises three different forms of compen-
sation to its users-cash, prizes, and "G Money."'97 Hence, the users who pro-
vide entertaining content and encourage others to use the Web site may receive
compensation. 9 As in Hy Cite-where the court found that the defendant was
possibly an information content provider because it offered to pay third-party
posters for content-Gossip Report makes promises of future compensation in
the form of both money and merchandise.'99 Thus, a court could hold its opera-
tors responsible for the creation or development of the user-provided informa-
tion on Gossip Report.
In short, because of immunity under the CDA, a defendant Web site opera-
tor normally is not liable for the content of information created by a user, even
if the information is defamatory or libelous.2" However, in order to receive the
protection, a service provider must adhere to his or her role as a service pro-
vider. If the service provider adds additional content to the site or induces users
to create content with promises of compensation, then these actions may war-
rant treatment of the service provider as an information content provider, mak-
ing the provider liable for any defamatory content.
Therefore, to be protected by the CDA, non-celebrity gossip Web site opera-
tors must ensure that they act as providers of an interactive computer service-
neutral conduits for information-and not as the creators or developers of the
content."' Once the plaintiff has established that the defendant service provider
is responsible for the creation or development of the content on which the
claim is based, the defendant may then be liable for that content, even when it
is posted by a third party." However, if the plaintiff has a claim for a violation
of intellectual property laws-specifically the right of publicity-who pro-
196 A description of the site's purpose and use appears on its homepage: "On GossipRe-
port.com you can anonymously talk about anyone you want. Instead of creating a profile
about yourself, you can create a profile about someone else." Gossip Report, supra note 2 1.
197 Gossip Report FAQ, supra note 4. Student users have the option of earning $500 by
recruiting the most other students to join Gossip Report. Id. Additionally, the operators
compensate users with "G Money" if they provide gossip entertaining enough to be tagged
as "Hot and Juicy, Funny, or True," by inviting others to join Gossip Report, or providing
additional information upon logging into the site. Id. Finally, users who attend "Gossip Par-
ties" are eligible to win "free drinks, free GossipReport.com merchandise, and a chance to
win cool prizes!" Id.
198 Id.
199 Compare Hy Cite, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (finding that the inducement of compensa-
tion for posts may possibly lead to liability), with Gossip Report FAQ, supra note 4 (induc-
ing users to encourage others to join and post with prizes, cash, and other compensation).
200 See supra Part I.A (discussion of the CDA and the immunities it grants).
201 See supra Part III.B.2.
202 See supra Part III.B.2 (an examination of when interactive computer service provid-
ers' conduct exposes them to liability although normally they would be immune under the
CDA).
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vided the infringing content may be irrelevant. 3
IV. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: SHOULD NON-CELEBRITY GOSSIP
SITE OPERATORS CARE?
To understand the applicability of the right of publicity to the immunity
provision of the CDA, an understanding of the right is required. First, the
genesis of the right is explained, and then, an examination of the interpretation
and adoption of the right follows.
A. Right of Publicity: A Historical Perspective
The right of publicity stems from the right to privacy, 4 originating specifi-
cally from Warren and Brandeis's argument for every person's inherent right
"to be let alone."2 5 Since 1950, various courts and commentators have molded
and shaped the right of publicity.2" Today, the right of publicity is recognized
as "the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of
his or her identity.""2 7
Over a century ago, in response to an increasingly invasive press and ag-
gressive advertising techniques, Brandeis and Warren attempted to define the
scope and breadth of one's right to privacy.0 ' Brandeis and Warren specifically
focused on one's right "to be let alone," believing that human beings have an
inherent right to privacy.2 9 However, the right "to be let alone" did not directly
203 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2000); supra Part III.B.3.
204 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
[I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy ... , a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of pub-
lishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made "in gross," i.e., without
an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else .... This right might be
called a "right of publicity."
Id.; Thomas Phillip Boggess V, Cause of Action for an Infringement on the Right of Public-
ity, in 31 CAUSES OF ACTION 121, § 2 (2d ed. 2006).
205 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 ("Recent inventions and business methods
call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for
securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone.').
206 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977) (holding
the First and Fourteenth Amendments are not a bar to recovery for suits based on the right
of publicity); Boggess, supra note 204, § 2 (explaining that Professor Nimmer created the
idea that the right of publicity should really be categorized under the umbrella of unfair
competition rather than privacy and Professor Prosser's tort theory of the right of publicity
was included in the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
207 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2004).
208 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 ("Instantaneous photographs and newspaper
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life ... .
209 Id.
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address the issue of how celebrities--or those who put themselves in the public
sphere--could prevent the unauthorized commercial use of their images."'
Consequently, courts often reached inconsistent holdings based on similar fact
patterns."'
In 1953, Judge Frank "coined the term 'right of publicity' to start a break
away from thinking of all [the celebrity] cases under the terms and theory of
the right to privacy." ' This new "right of publicity" concept initially recog-
nized a pecuniary value in the use of an individual's image."' Moreover, Judge
Frank specifically noted the different nature of claims brought by a celebrity,
as compared to claims brought by an ordinary individual, reasoning that celeb-
rities must suffer more than just "bruised feelings" to be entitled to damages:
For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their like-
nesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines,
busses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no money
unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other ad-
vertiser from using their pictures. 4
The right of publicity developed slowly and inconsistently "[l]ike a statue
emerging from a formless block of stone."' In 1977, the Supreme Court first
addressed the right of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co. In Zacchini, the defendant ("Scripps") used Zacchini's image in a news
broadcast, as opposed to a commercial advertisement.2 6
Zacchini was hired to perform a human cannonball routine at a county
210 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 1:38 (explaining plaintiffs had to frame their causes of
action as "hurt feelings," and celebrities whose images were commonly used would have a
difficult time proving indignity over the use of their image).
211 See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (1941) (holding that the
plaintiff, a famous football player waived his right to privacy by "constantly seeking and
receiving" publicity and, therefore, was not entitled to any damages on his claim that his
image was used to promote beer without his consent); but cf Edison v. Edison Polyform
Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 395 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (holding the defendant, Edison Polyform, liable
for using Thomas Edison's name and image without consent).
212 Boggess, supra note 204, §2; see Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 202
F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) ("[I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy ...,
a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph .... This right might be called a
'right of publicity."').
213 Haelan Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d at 868.
214 Id.
215 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, §1:39.
Despite this increasing trend toward recognizing a distinct right to control the commer-
cial exploitation of one's name and likeness, the development of this right has been
spasmodic. This is in part a consequence of courts adjudicating claims which might be
categorized as invasions of plaintiffs right of publicity as privacy claims.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 439 n. 14 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
216 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563-64 (1977).
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fair.2 7 During a performance, Zacchini asked a Scripps reporter to not record
the spectacle.2 ' The reporter initially granted Zacchini's request, but returned
the next day and filmed his performance." 9 That evening, nearly the entire act
was broadcast on the eleven o'clock news for public viewing.22° Zacchini ar-
gued that the dissemination of his "entire act" violated his right of publicity
and as a result, Scripps was liable for damages.2 ' Scripps argued that it was
immune from such claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.22
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the rebroadcast of the entire human
cannonball routine violated Zacchini's right of publicity and the First and
Fourteenth Amendments did not protect Scripps from litigation in this in-
stance. 23 The majority emphasized that "neither the public nor [Scripps] will
be deprived of the benefit of [Zacchini's] performance as long as his commer-
cial stake in his act is appropriately recognized."224 This suggests the potential
violation of the right of publicity cannot be a broadcast of the "entire act"
without compensation.22 lmportantly, however, the Court distinguished
Scripps' broadcast of the "entire act" from a report containing only the "news-
worthy" information regarding Zacchini's act.226 Thus, the Court in Zacchini
not only recognized the state-law created right to privacy, but it also carved out
the "newsworthy" exception to the right to privacy.2
217 Id. Zacchini claimed the performance was a secret family act, consisting of him being
shot from a cannon into a net. Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 564.
220 Id. at 564 & fn.1.
221 Id. at 564-65.
222 Id. (detailing Scripps movement for summary judgment, which the trial court granted
and Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, explaining Scripps could only violate Zacchini's right
of publicity if the station intended to "appropriate [the clip] ... for some non-privileged
private use" or to injure Zacchini).
223 See id at 578. The Court reasoned the protection of one's right to publicity "is
grounded in the.., image." Id. at 575-76. However, the Court did note that the fostering of
creative performing rewards the public. Id. at 576-77.
224 Id. at 578.
225 See id. at 574-75 (noting that the Zacchini's right of publicity would not prevent
Scripps from reporting only the "newsworthy" facts about his performance, but distinguish-
ing the broadcast of Zacchini's entire human cannonball performance without his consent by
analogizing it to an unauthorized broadcast of a copyrighted film or play in its entirety).
226 See id.; see also id. at 580-81 (Powell, J., dissenting) (lamenting the "entire act"
analysis for fear that provides no clear precedent to follow and may lead to news media self-
censorship or lower standards in news media, thus depriving the public of a valid, protected
source of information).
227 See MCCARTHY, supra note 207; Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574-75, 578 (1977) (stating
that the right of publicity does not prevent the media from reporting "newsworthy facts"
about the plaintiff's act, but clarifying that the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution do not immunize the media when broadcasting "a performer's entire act with-
out his consent").
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As demonstrated by Zacchini, the right of publicity can conflict with First
Amendment protections. Based on these protections, courts continue to uphold
the "newsworthy exception," allowing the news media to use an individual's
name and likeness where that same use in the commercial context would be
prohibited.228
While courts were defining the scope and breadth of the right of publicity
and distinguishing it from the right to privacy, scholars and other commenta-
tors similarly differentiated this new right from its origins in the right to pri-
vacy.229 Specifically, scholars have sought to justify the existence of the right
of publicity on different grounds from the right to privacy. 3 ° Some argue that
the "human identity" is itself an inherent property right of all individuals.23 ' In
the context of anonymous non-celebrity gossip Web sites, the individual's
property right is essentially eradicated when an anonymous third party can
usurp an individual's identity; display it online anonymously in a negative,
untrue, context; and leave the individual without legal recourse against those
who operate the site.232
As one commentator puts it, "[i]f the overall picture of an individual's char-
acter is made up of the messages conveyed by her associational decisions, then
unauthorized use of her identity interferes with her autonomy because the third
party takes at least partial control of the meaning associated with her." '233
Non-celebrity gossip Web sites are exactly the type of unauthorized exploi-
228 Alicia M. Hunt, Comment, Everyone Wants to Be a Star: Extensive Publicity Rights
for Noncelebrities Unduly Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1605, 1609-10
(2001).
Courts have acknowledged that the right of publicity clashes with the First Amend-
ment, and as a result, courts have carved out a "newsworthiness" exception into the
right of publicity, which broadly permits the media to use people's names and photos
without liability. Generally speaking, however, commercial advertisements are not af-
forded [the same] protection ....
Id. (citations omitted).
229 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995) (explaining
that Professor William Prosser authored an analysis of the torts of privacy in the 1960s; a
work so influential, his discussion of the right of publicity was later included in the Second
Restatement of Torts). The discussion continues today among modem academics. E.g., Sta-
cey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1181 (2006) (distinguishing the right of publicity by its justifi-
cation on morality and economic efficiency grounds, which are justifications closer to copy-
right and trademark law than that of the right to privacy); Mark P. McKenna, The Right of
Publicity andAutonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REv. 225, 282 (2005) (noting that
unauthorized use of an individual's image interferes with that person's autonomy by remov-
ing personal choice).
230 See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 229, at 1181; McKenna, supra note 229.
231 E.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 2.2 (explaining that the right of publicity is a
recognition of a person's identity, which is unique and worth protecting).
232 E.g., McKenna, supra note 229, at 282.
233 Id.
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tations that serve to distort others' perceptions of an individual through no fault
of that individual. Although an anonymous photograph of an individual may be
a true representation of that individual, the third party, hiding behind his or her
anonymity, often posts the photograph in a misleading and negative context
that serves to embarrass or humiliate the photographed. 34
Still others believe that the right of publicity is justified by economic princi-
ples, noting the inherent inefficiency of someone using statements made about
or by a celebrity-even if true-for personal gain or commercial profit without
authorization. 35
These three justifications for the right of publicity are similar to those of
several other legal rights; in particular, the right not to have one's trademark
infringed, the right not to have one's copyright violated, and the right not to be
defamed are similar. 36 While these areas are distinct and do not directly apply
to the right of publicity,2 37 these areas establish that the legal concept behind a
right to publicity is valid and accepted.
B. Modem Acceptance of Publicity As a Right
The right of publicity is a state law doctrine; therefore, its acceptance and
application vary among the twenty-four jurisdictions that recognize it.238 Al-
though the general purpose of the doctrine-to protect one's image from being
commercially exploited without consent-remains constant, the specific ele-
ments of the prima facie case differ slightly among jurisdictions.3 Perhaps in
234 See, e.g., Club Thrust, supra note 25.
235 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 229, at 1184 ("[U]nless we centralize control over valu-
able resources such as fame, they will suffer from overuse and ultimately lose all their
value.")
236 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
[T]he State's interest in permitting a "right of publicity" is in protecting the proprietary
interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.... [T]he
State's interest is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing
on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and having little to do
with protecting feelings or reputation.
Id.
237 See MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 3:8 (explaining the right of publicity depends on a
third party being able to "identify" the plaintiff; while the test for trademark infringement
hinges on a "likelihood of confusion" by the prospective customer or audience; and a suc-
cessful defamation claim requires that plaintiff to prove that the defendant's allegedly false
statement were "of and concerning" the plaintiff), 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2006) (establish-
ing that copyright law only serves to protect "original works of authorship fixed in any tan-
gible medium of expression" and specifically excludes ideas, concepts, methods of opera-
tion, and other intangibles). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49
(1995).
238 See MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 1:3; Boggess, supra note 204, § 5.
239 Boggess, supra note 204, § 5. For example, Colorado recognizes the tort of invasion
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reaction to the patchwork of definitions and standards across the states, the
recent trend in the state and federal courts has been to follow the model prima
facie elements outlined in the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition ("Re-
statement").2" The Restatement outlines the elements of the prima facie case,
which require the plaintiff to establish
(1) Validity. Plaintiff owns an enforceable right in the identity or persona of a human
being; and
(2) Infringement.
(A) Defendant, without permission, has used some aspect of identity or persona in
such a way that plaintiff is identifiable from defendant's use; and
(B) Defendant's use is likely to cause damage to the commercial value of that per-
sona.
2 4
'
Although the elements of the prima facie standard for the right of publicity
seem fairly straightforward, courts have varied in their interpretation and
treatment of them.
242
1. Validity: Plaintiff Has an Enforceable Right in the Identity or Persona of a
Human Being
Only twenty-four states recognize the right of publicity, and not all of them
grant that right to everyone.243 Courts generally recognize that a celebrity has
the right to control the commercial exploitation of his or her identity.2" How-
of privacy by misappropriation, which requires a showing that "(1) the defendant used the
plaintiff's name or likeness; (2) the use of the plaintiffs name or likeness for the defen-
dant's own purposes or benefit, commercially or otherwise; (3) the plaintiff suffered dam-
ages; and (4) the defendant caused the damages incurred." Id. (citing Joe Dickerson &
Assoc., LLC v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995 (Colo. 2001)). The Kentucky variation on the right of
publicity recognizes the right for every individual, but requires some showing that the indi-
vidual's identity actually "has commercial value." Cheatham v. Paisano Publications, Inc.,
891 F. Supp. 381, 386 (W.D. Ky. 1995). In contrast, Pennsylvania recognizes that the right
of publicity "grants a person an exclusive right to control the commercial value of his name
and likeness and to prevent others from exploiting that value without permission." Boggess,
supra. Put another way, in Pennsylvania, the right of publicity applies to both celebrities and
noncelebrities alike. Id. (paraphrasing from both Apple Corps. Ltd. v. Button Master, P.C.P.,
Inc., 1998 WL 126935 (E.D. Pa. 1998); and Fanelle v. Lojack Corp., 2000 WL 1801270
(E.D. Pa. 2000)).
240 Boggess, supra note 204, § 5; see, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg, Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 827 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing the Missouri
Supreme Court's use of the Restatement).
241 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 3:2 (citations omitted); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49.
242 See Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956) (stating
that "consistency is a rare jewel" in the process of courts "working out the development of a
new common law right").
243 See Boggess, supra note 204, § 5.
244 See Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (recog-
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ever, in the case of a non-celebrity, courts are split; they disagree as to whether
the persona or identity of a non-celebrity has any commercial value.245 The ma-
jority view is that an individual's celebrity status goes only to the issue of
damages, while the minority holds that non-celebrities do not have an enforce-
able right of publicity."6 The prima facie case would thus be different depend-
ing on the jurisdiction.
In a majority jurisdiction, the court recognizes that all people have an en-
forceable right of publicity and that its purpose is to protect "the relatively un-
known to the world famous" from commercial exploitation.247 Because the ce-
lebrity plaintiffs have the opportunity to recover for both commercial damage
to their reputation and for hurt feelings, the majority view extends this princi-
ple to all people equally: "noncelebrities, foreign celebrities, and celebrities
who refuse to trade on their name ought equally to be able to prevent confusing
or diluting uses of their names and likenesses." '248 The majority view recognizes
that even the identity of a virtually unknown individual can have at least some
nominal commercial value, which is proven by the defendant's commercial
exploitation of the individual's identity or persona.249
On the other hand, the minority view is that non-celebrities do not have an
enforceable right of publicity.25 The logic behind this view is that "[b]ecause
the right of publicity rests on the idea of damage to property of demonstrated
economic worth, it does not extend to the misappropriation of a person's name
or likeness when that person has not previously exploited these attributes in
some commercial manner."25' Therefore, under the minority view, a non-
celebrity plaintiff does not have an enforceable right because there is no com-
mercial loss associated with non-celebrities; they are not entitled to recover for
merely hurt feelings under a claim for a violation of their rights of publicity.252
nizing value in a celebrities name and the celebrity has the right to control and profit from
the commercial use); cf Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. Christian Bros., Inc., 943 F. Supp.
1136, 1139-40 (D. Minn. 1996) (discussing celebrity endorsements).
245 See, e.g., Fanelle v. Lojack Corp., 2000 WL 1801270, at *11 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("Inher-
ent in the act of a defendant using a person's name, identity, or persona in a commercially
advantageous manner is the presumption that the identity has commercial value .... [The
court is] convinced that the right of publicity resides in every person, not just famous and
infamous individuals."); cf Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F. Supp. 40, 42 (N.D. Ill.
1996) ("The plaintiff claiming the infringement of this right must show that, prior to the
defendant's use, the plaintiffs name, likeness, or persona had commercial value.").
246 See MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 4:14-15.
247 Onassis v. Christian Dior-N.Y., Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
248 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 229, at 1211.
249 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995); MCCARTHY,
supra note 207, § 4:17.
250 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 4:15.
251 Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1591 n.78 (1979).
252 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 4:15; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COM-
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The minority jurisdictions believe that a non-celebrity plaintiff's recovery is
best obtained through either a claim for the invasion of privacy or unjust en-
richment. "
2. Infringement on an Individual's Right of Publicity
Assuming a jurisdiction recognizes the ability of a non-celebrity to recover
on a right of publicity claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate infringement upon
the right. To do so, the plaintiff must establish that he or she is identifiable
from the use by the defendant and that the defendant's use of the image is
likely to cause damage to the plaintiff.
a. Plaintiff Is Identifiable from Defendant's Unauthorized Use of His or Her
Image
After an individual establishes an enforceable right of publicity, the plaintiff
must then prove that the defendant (1) without consent (2) used a characteristic
of his or her identity in a manner from which (3) plaintiff was identifiable.254
Generally, a plaintiff can demonstrate identifiability through the entirety of the
defendant's use, pointing to any and all aspects of the plaintiffs identity that
the defendant employed. 5 Whether the aspects of an individual's identity ac-
tually "identify" the plaintiff is determined by their association with the plain-
tiff and may vary depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.256
First, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant used his or her identity
without consent.2 57 On the whole, whether the plaintiff consented to the defen-
dant's use of his or her image is a clear-cut issue and easily determined by the
PETITION § 46 cmt. b.
253 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, §§ 4:15, 4:16 n.12.
254 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 3:2; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 46 cmt. b.; accord Prima v. Darden Rest., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (D.N.J.
2000).
255 See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that a com-
bination of the likeness used, the context of the likeness, and the caption for the likeness
sufficiently identified the plaintiff); Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587,
591-95 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (finding a play on words using the plaintiffs name sufficiently
identified the plaintiff); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wis.
1979) (finding a nickname identified the plaintiff); Negri v. Schering Corp, 333 F. Supp.
101, 104-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding a forty-year-old photograph still identified the plain-
tiff).
256 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (stating aspects of a per-
son's identity may identify them "only if they are so closely and uniquely associated with
the identity of a particular individual that their use enables the defendant to appropriate the
commercial value of the person's identity.")
257 Id. § 46; Boggess, supra note 204, § 12.
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trier of fact.25
Second, after establishing that the defendant did not have permission to use
the plaintiffs identity in a commercial manner without consent, the plaintiff
must prove that some aspect of his or her identity or persona259 was used.260
Courts generally accept the use of any particular aspect of a person's persona
as long as the unique characteristics "are so closely and uniquely associated
with the identity of a particular individual that [the defendant's] use enables
the defendant to appropriate the commercial value of the person's identity."26'
The most common and obvious infringement on the right of publicity in-
volves the use of an individual's distinguishable name, photograph, or other
likeness.262 Often, shrewd defendants will use very subtle aspects that link to
the plaintiffs identity in order to avoid liability.263 However, although each
instance taken individually would not be sufficient to infringe on the plaintiffs
right of publicity, several understated characteristics taken in combination may
be sufficient to identify the plaintiff and infringe on his or her right of public-
ity.2" This flexibility in the courts' approach allows the plaintiff to draw from
258 Boggess, supra note 204, §12. The issue of consent can become more complicated
when there has been a previous working relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff
in the form of a license or release form. In those situations, issues of scope of the release of
license and timing become pivotal. Id. The resolution of those two issues often determines
whether the plaintiff had actually consented to the defendant's use. See id.; cf Haelan Labs.,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that the
defendant's liability partially turned on whether the plaintiff's licensing contracts expired).
259 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 4:46 ("The term 'persona' is increasingly used as a
label to signify the cluster of commercial values embodied in a personal identity as well as
to signify that human identity 'identifiable' from defendant's usage.").
260 MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 3:2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§§ 46-47.
261 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d.
262 See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, 304 (D.N.H. 2008)
(finding that the defendant Web site operator may have violated the plaintiff's right of pub-
licity when her image was used in advertising without her consent); see also Ali v. Playgirl,
Inc. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that a portrait similar to Muhammad Ali
could be identified as Ali); Beverly v. Choices Women's Med. Ctr., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275,
278 (N.Y. 1991) (finding that the a calendar containing customer satisfaction testimonials
and distributed to potential clients was for advertising purposes and the unauthorized use of
the plaintiffs image within it constituted a violation of her right of publicity); Cohen v.
Herbal Concepts, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1984) (stating the plaintiff must be recogniz-
able in the advertisement for a valid claim for infringement of an individual's right of pub-
licity); Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594-95 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (con-
cluding the use of a musician's name in an advertisement without his consent could violate
his right of publicity).
263 See, e.g., Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 726-27 (finding that the plaintiff's right of publicity
was violated when the defendant, through a combination of the likeness used, the context of
the likeness, and the caption for the likeness, plaintiffs persona was identifiable).
264 Id.
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the entirety of the defendant's use in order to make the claim.265 Yet, the lack of
clear precedent in this area creates an additional burden for the plaintiff to
overcome.2 6 Further, in every case, whether an aspect of a persona is properly
attributable to an individual hinges on identifiability.26'
Because the right of publicity involves the wrongful appropriation of an-
other's identity for commercial use, the third element of the prima facie case
requires that the use of the identity must identify the plaintiff.268 Although case
law has not created a clear definition of what constitutes identifiability,269 it is
clear that the use must be more than an incidental or coincidental similarity.
27
The issue then becomes how many of those who were exposed to the publicity
can identify the plaintiff from the defendant's use.
No specific method exists to determine the requisite level of recognition
necessary for the plaintiff to be identified, and the determination is often based
on the facts of each individual case. 27' For celebrities, this requisite level of
recognition can be established through a poll or survey of those exposed to the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity. 72 By contrast, in the case of non-
celebrities, courts seem to require more than identifiability by the plaintiff and
family members. 73 Once the plaintiff establishes the defendant's use identifies
265 See id. at 736-28.
266 See Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir.
1982) (finding that the use of plaintiffs movie characters without consent in a commercial
manner is insufficient to violate the plaintiffs right of publicity); Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F.
Supp. 2d 446, 452-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding candy company's creation and commercial
use of cartoon characters dressed in the plaintiffs "signature costume" did not constitute a
"portrait or picture" because "[m]erely evoking certain aspects of another's character or role
does not violate" an individual's right of publicity).
267 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995).
268 ld.; MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 3:2.
269 See Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594-95 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(explaining that "there are many ways a plaintiff can be identified in a defendant's use," and
the plaintiff's identifiability "will probably not be a disputable issue in the majority of meri-
torious Right of Publicity cases.").
270 E.g., Hooker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D. I11.
1982) (finding the plaintiff not identified by the similarity in name between the plaintiff, a
famous wood sculptor, and the defendant's creation of the same name, a television character
in a fictional "police drama").
271 Cf Boggess, supra note 204, §6 (providing several cases that determined whether the
plaintiff was identifiable through several different methods).
272 E.g., Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (explaining that the plaintiff used survey results
where respondents to the survey were asked, if based on the advertisement at issues, they
believed the plaintiff endorsed the product); Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F. Supp. 40,
42 (N.D. I11. 1996) (stating the defendant determined identifiability by surveying video
game users and asking whether the plaintiff could be identified as the model for a character
in the video game).
273 See, e.g., Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 217 N.E.2d 736 (Mass. 1966) (holding
plaintiff was not legally identifiable where the only people able to identify plaintiff were
those familiar with the actual taking of the photograph); MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 3:20
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the plaintiff, the number of people who can identify the plaintiff affects the
degree and type of remedy to which he or she is entitled.274 If identifiability is
established, the plaintiff must show damage was suffered as a result of the use.
b. Defendant's Commercial Use of Plaintiff's Image Is Likely to Cause
Damage to Plaintiff
In order to infringe on the plaintiffs right of publicity, the defendant must
use the plaintiff's persona for commercial or trade purposes in a manner that
would likely cause damage to its commercial value.275 In deciding whether a
defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity is commercial, courts must balance
the right of publicity against the broader Right of Free Speech granted by the
First Amendment.
276
The classic illustration of the use of an individual's identity for commercial
or trade purposes is the use of the individual's likeness to advertise the defen-
dant's good or service.277 However, "the use of a person's identity in news re-
porting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction" is not con-
sidered a commercial use. 278 To determine whether a defendant's use is truly
commercial and therefore limited by constitutional balancing between free
speech and property rights, courts generally look to the informational content
of the use and balance it against the content's commercial attraction.2 79 The
underlying motive of the publisher is a consideration; courts can look to
("There must be some de minimis rule to filter or screen out the frivolous cases where only
the plaintiff and a few sympathetic relatives and friends can see any connection between
[the] defendant's use and plaintiff'). But see, e.g., Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F.
Supp. 909, 912-13 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (holding there was a triable issue of fact where
friends, family, and acquaintances could identify plaintiff from an altered photograph);
Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 472 N.E. 2d 307, 308 (N.Y. 1984) (holding there was an
issue of identifiability where the husband and father of the plaintiffs could identify them
from "back view" photos used in advertisements).
274 See MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 3:20.
275 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46,49 (1995).
276 See Boggess, supra note 204, §§ 22-24.
277 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 & cmts. a-b; see, e.g., Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc. 447 F. Supp. 723, 726-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating unauthorized use of an
individual's picture could be considered a commercial use unless the image was used in
connection with the news); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299
(D.N.H. 2008) (finding the use of an online profile identifying the plaintiff for advertise-
ments and "teasers" as a commercial or trade purpose sufficient enough to overcome the
burden necessary to survive a motion to dismiss); Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F.
Supp. 2d 587, 596-97 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (discussing the difference between incidental use
and commercial use).
278 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47.
279 See MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 3:46; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 229, at 1217-
20; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 & cmts. b-c.
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whether the publisher used the persona "for the value associated with it. 28
That an item is sold commercially also weighs in this consideration, but it is
not dispositive.2 ' Otherwise, newspapers, magazines, and books would fall
outside the scope of the informative and entertaining speech that the Constitu-
tion protects. 2
A recognized "newsworthy" exception serves as a First Amendment protec-
tion; it includes both "descriptions of actual events" and "articles concerning
political happenings, social trends, or any subject of public interest. '283 This
includes factual information regarding public officials and other public fig-
ures. 84 Though broadly defined, the newsworthy exception is easily distin-
guishable from a use in advertising or trade purposes. An individual's likeness
is used 'for advertising purposes' if it appears in a publication which, taken in
its entirety, was distributed for use in, or as part of, an advertisement or solici-
tation for patronage of a particular product or service. ''2" The image or likeness
is used for trade purposes when the use does "not really pertain[] to matters of
public interest," including uses "afflicted with substantial falsification. 2 6 Es-
sentially, if the image does not relate to the article or if the "article is an adver-
tisement in disguise," including cases where the "plaintiffs photograph, when
juxtaposed with an article, could reasonably have been viewed as falsifying or
fictionalizing [the] plaintiff's relation to the article," then the use of an individ-
ual's identity is for a commercial or trade purpose. 7
For example, if a publisher used a photograph of a public figure on the cover
of the magazine that contained an article about the plaintiff, the use would
generally be protected by the Constitution as newsworthy, noncommercial
speech.288 However, if the same publisher used the public figure's image with-
280 Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 592-93.
281 Davis v. High Soc'y Mag. Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 229, at 1217.
282 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 229, at 1217.
283 Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552 (N.Y. 2000).
284 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974). In Gertz, the Supreme
Court discussed what, aside from running for public office, rendered an individual a public
figure:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial promi-
nence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and in-
fluence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those
classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event,
they invite attention and comment.
Id. at 345.
285 Beverly v. Choices Women's Med. Ctr., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278 (N.Y.199 1).
286 Davis v. High Soc'y Mag., Inc. 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 314 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
287 Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 553.
288 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. a.
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out consent solely for the purpose of increasing the sales of a magazine issue
without newsworthy information about the public figure without consent, the
defendant would have likely violated the public figure's right of publicity.289
The publisher's actions would be even more likely to violate an individual's
right of publicity when the image is that of someone who is not a public figure.
That is, because information about a person who is not a public figure, whether
accurate or not, is not inherently newsworthy.29 Therefore, a publisher who
uses images of non-celebrities without permission in a commercial context
outside the protection of the newsworthy exception has likely violated the right
of publicity of those individuals.
With the use of an individual's image established as the final piece of a
prima facie claim, the full prima facie case may be summarized. First, the
plaintiff must verify that he or she has legal grounds to file such a claim, in-
cluding whether or not the jurisdiction recognizes the right. 9' Next, the plain-
tiff must prove that the defendant, without permission, used aspects of his or
her identity in such a manner that he or she is identifiable from the defendant's
unauthorized use.292 Finally, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that the defen-
dant's use was for commercial purposes and does not fall within the newswor-
thy exception or is otherwise protected.293 Once the plaintiff has established
these elements, he or she can both obtain an injunction prohibiting further ex-
ploitation of the plaintiff's identity and recover monetarily from the defen-
dant.9
This right of publicity might provide some protection for non-celebrities
289 See id. § 47 & cmts. b-c.
290 See Davis, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 313 ("[I]t has been recognized that certain publications
are of public interest and, therefore, protected, even if not strictly concerned with news ....
The question in such cases is whether the public interest aspect of the publication is merely
incidental to its commercial purpose."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §
47 cmt. c ("The use of a person's identity primarily for the purpose of communicating in-
formation or expressing ideas is not generally actionable .... However, if the name or like-
ness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified person,
the user may be subject to liability."); cf Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 344-45
(1974) (noting in the context of defamation that there is a distinction between public and
private individuals, in that the former has subjected himself to the public's scrutiny and
society has an interest in knowing about his or her activities).
291 See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing whether a potential plaintiff may file a claim for
violation of right of publicity).
292 See infra Part IV.B. 1 (discussing how a plaintiff would prove the defendant used the
plaintiff s identity).
293 See infra Part IV.B.2.b (discussing whether the defendant's use of plaintiff's identity
is actually commercial in nature).
294 Boggess, supra note 204, § 37. The standard remedy for infringement of one's right
of publicity is an injunction preventing the defendant from continuing to use the plaintiff's
identity in an unauthorized manner; but, where a plaintiff can prove a specific amount,
monetary relief is available. See id.
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who find themselves the subject of anonymous gossip online. The operators of
non-gossip Web sites may be liable for a violation of non-celebrities' rights of
publicity, even though the content is almost exclusively published by a third
party. Whether an individual actually has a case depends on the amount of in-
formation about him or her provided on the Web site and the ability to estab-
lish that their identity is used for a commercial or trade purpose.
V. POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF NON-CELEBRITY GOSSIP WEB SITE
OPERATORS FOR CLAIMS BASED ON A VIOLATION OF AN
INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Unquestionably, the CDA relieves computer service providers from state
tort liability arising from information provided by an outside information con-
tent provider, whereas their print, radio, and television counterparts would be
liable.295 However, Congress did not want to encourage the use of the Intemet
as a tool for violating intellectual property laws.296 To that end, Congress in-
cluded an explicit exception to the CDA's immunity: violations of intellectual
property law.297
Non-celebrity gossip Web site operators are fully aware of this exception to
their otherwise robust immunity, and many warn their users not to violate fed-
eral intellectual property laws as well as provide procedures to remove infring-
ing content.29 However, a growing number of courts have found that Web site
operators that violate state-created intellectual property rights-including the
right of publicity-receive no immunity under the CDA.299 Hence, Web site
operators likely are liable for the content that infringes on an individual's right
295 See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003); Blu-
menthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000).
296 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
297 Id.
298 See, e.g., GossipReport.com, Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, http://www.
gossipreport.com/terms.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009); USAGoneDirty.com, Terms of
Service, supra note 26. The legal sections, terms of service, and user agreements that Web
site operators supply specifically prohibit infringement of copyright and trademark laws and
also include a general catchall phrase prohibiting users from violating any other intellectual
property rights. See, e.g., GossipReport.com, Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy,
supra; USAGoneDirty.com, Terms of Service, supra.
299 See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.N.H. 2008) (dis-
agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation that the intellectual property exception of the
CDA applies to only federal intellectual property rights); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs.,
135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to limit the CDA intellectual prop-
erty exclusion to those situations and laws enacted at the time of the passage of the CDA in
1996). Contra Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (de-
fining "intellectual property" in the CDA as "federal intellectual property" because of the
CDA's stated goal of removing constraints related to the multiple jurisdictions of state
laws).
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to publicity, even if the content was provided by a third party and even though
the operator took no part in its creation or development.3" Various federal
courts have held interactive computer service providers may be liable for third
party violations of the plaintiffs right of publicity."' These rulings potentially
expose non-celebrity gossip site operators to liability from which they were
previously insulated. The following section explores non-celebrity gossip Web
site operators' potential liability arising from a claim based on a violation of an
individual's right of publicity.
A. Establishing an Individual's Identifiability on a Non-celebrity Gossip Web
Site
Once the plaintiff has established that the defendant's use was unauthorized,
the plaintiff must then demonstrate that he or she is identifiable from the de-
fendant's use.302 Courts have accepted that individual aspects of a plaintiffs
image may establish identifiability so long as they are "closely and uniquely
associated" with the plaintiff in light of the facts surrounding the claim.3°3 Ini-
tially, courts found an infringement of the plaintiff's right of publicity in cases
where the defendant used the plaintiffs photograph,"' but as the right devel-
oped, courts have found even more tenuous connections can violate the right of
publicity. These more tenuous connections include the use of the plaintiffs
name and biographical information °3 or references to an individual's per-
300 See, e.g., Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 302-04 ("[W]hile protecting
third-party intellectual property rights no doubt presents some challenges for service provid-
ers . .. those challenges would appear to be simply a cost of doing business on-line.");
Gucci Am., 135 F. Supp. 2d at 415-17 (finding that the CDA does not immunize Web site
operators from valid claims for infringement of state intellectual property rights). See also
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
301 See, e.g., Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 302-04; Gucci Am., 135 F. Supp.
2d at 412-17.
302 Boggess, supra note 204, § 35; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 46 & cmt. d (1995); MCCARTHY, supra note 207, § 3:20.
303 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d; see Boggess, supra note
204, § 6.
304 See, e.g., Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir.
1953) (finding that a right to publicity exists where the defendant used a photograph for a
commercial purpose without consent).
305 See, e.g., Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590-91, 594-95 (N.D.
Tex. 1999) (finding that there was no need to use the actual full name as long as the phrase
used was sufficient to identify the plaintiff in light of the circumstances); Uhlaender v. Hen-
ricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282-83 (D. Minn. 1970) (holding that the use of plaintiff's
name and statistical information in a commercial context even though the information was
available to the public was enough to identify the plaintiff); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enter.,
Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (finding that the use of a name and
biographical data can be sufficient to identify someone).
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sona.3° Because courts have not established a clear precedent defining how
many and what specific type of aspects of the plaintiffs image are necessary
for identifiability, the plaintiffs difficulty in overcoming this burden will vary
depending on the Web site against which the plaintiff has filed suit.
For instance, the Dirty's use of photographs, coupled with an individual's
university, and often accompanied by at least a partial name and other identify-
ing details provide potential plaintiffs with significant evidence of identifiabil-
ity.3 °7 These aspects of the individual's image should be sufficient to "identify"
this individual within the meaning of the right of publicity.3"8
Comparatively, Gossip Report takes indentifiability a step further. On Gos-
sipReport.com, users create profiles about others in order to gossip about
them.30 9 Subsequently, other users can then search for a person by name or by
category in order to read any gossip posted about them." The entire premise of
making a profile for someone else on this site is to allow other users to identify
and gossip about that person."' The use of an individual's name, photograph,
and other biographical information likely would allow users to identify an in-
dividual for the purposes of his right of publicity.3"2
The final significant non-celebrity gossip Web site, College ACB, allows its
users to post gossip to the site and classify the gossip by college campus,
anonymously.3"3 Users of College ACB, cannot post photographs,3 4 so to bring
a claim against its operators, possible plaintiffs would likely have to be identi-
fied by full name and other identifying information.3 ' Where an anonymous
gossiper uses an individual's name in the title of the posting and includes ref-
erences to that person's school, activity, and social circle, it is more likely that
the individual can be identified.3"6
The more aspects of the plaintiff's life posted on the Web site, the more
probable it is that the plaintiff will be identifiable from the posted content.
Sites such as the Dirty and Gossip Report allow users to post photographs of
others and include specific biographical information about them.3"7 When the
306 See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding plaintiff
was identifiable from use of his nickname as well as facial features and hairstyle unique to
him).
307 See The Dirty, supra note 21; supra Part IV.B.2.a.
308 See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
309 See GossipReport.com, supra note 21.
310 See id. (displaying a "search field"); GossipReport.com, FAQ, supra note 4.
311 See GossipReport.com, supra note 21.
312 See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
313 College ACB FAQ, supra note 4.
314 College ACB, supra note 2.
315 See supra Part IV.B.2.a (discussing the issue of identifiability).
316 See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
317 See The Dirty, supra note 21; GossipReport.com, supra note 21.
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defendant uses the plaintiff's photograph and specific biographic informa-
tion-such as their name-the plaintiff will easily be able to establish his or
her identifiability. 8 Sites like College ACB, which do not include photographs
of the person about whom the gossip is written, create a more difficult, but not
impossible burden for potential plaintiffs.' 9 Establishing that the plaintiff was
identifiable from the defendant's use is only the first half of the plaintiffs
claim for infringing on his or her right to publicity. The plaintiff must then es-
tablish that the defendant used the plaintiffs image for commercial purposes. 2°
B. Does Using an Individual's Likeness on a Non-celebrity Gossip Web Site
Constitute a Commercial Use?
Although the plaintiff may be identifiable from the defendant's use of his or
her image and persona, a defendant only violates a plaintiffs right of publicity
when he or she uses the plaintiff s image or persona in a commercial context. 2'
These sites rely on advertisements to generate revenue, and the number of us-
ers and visitors to a site drives advertisement sales, which in turn is reliant or
the content of the site to draw new and return visitors.322 Based on this business
model, an argument can be made that unauthorized use of one's identity or
persona on non-celebrity gossip sites constitutes a commercial use.
When deciding whether a defendant's use constitutes a commercial or trade
purpose, the underlying motive of the publisher is a consideration.323 Whether
the publisher sought profit or an increase in sales or distribution of the publica-
tion weighs strongly on the analysis, but it is not dispositive 2" Many publica-
tions, like newspapers and magazines, though operated for profit, serve the
public interest by spreading legitimate news stories and other nonfiction in-
formation of public interest.325
Therefore, to distinguish a protected unauthorized use of an individual's im-
age from a prohibited commercial exploitation, courts consider whether the
overall use of the image in the publication actually serves as an advertise-
318 See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
319 College ACB, supra note 2.
320 See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
321 See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
322 See A Juicy Shutdown, supra note 12; GossipReport.com, Terms and Conditions and
Privacy Policy, supra note 298, College ACB, Advertise, http://college.acb.com/sb.php?
school=general&page=advertise (last visited Feb. 20, 2009); The Dirty, Advertise, http://
www.thedirty.com/ ?pageid= 17 (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
323 Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592-93 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Davis
v. High Soc'y Mag., Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
324 Davis, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
325 See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmts. c-d (1995); cf
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977).
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ment 26 Courts make this determination based on whether there is a "lack of a
reasonable connection between the use [of the image] and a matter of public
interest, or on a finding that the use contained substantial fictionalization or
falsification. 327 If no connection exists or if the publication contains substan
tial inaccuracies, the use constitutes a commercial purpose.328
Turning to the three previously mentioned non-celebrity gossip Web sites,
the use of others' identities in order to gain increased profits likely constitutes
a commercial use. To begin, despite that some site operators claim some nobler
purpose in operating these Web sites,329 the fact remains that all of them re-
ceive money through advertisements, either directly on their Web site33° or in-
directly through it.3 ' The Web site operators depend on third parties to post
sensational information in hopes of generating more traffic for their Web sites,
creating a greater incentive for advertisers to promote their products or services
on the sites. Furthermore, the increased traffic allows the operators to charge
more for advertisements and, thus, generate more revenue.332 True, the sites are
not using people's identities in advertisements for their own site, which takes
this use outside the traditional examples of a commercial purpose.333 Nonethe-
326 See Beverly v. Choices Women's Med. Ctr., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278 (N.Y. 1991).
327 Davis, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
328 See id.
329 See Gossip Report, WWGD?, http://www.gossipreport.com/wwgd.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2009) ("Gossipreport.com is a better way to do what everybody does. Gossip has
been around for thousands of years; it's how communities have shaped and policed their
social behavior for centuries. In today's online community Gossipreport.com serves the
same purpose."); College ACB Press Release, supra note 180 ("The College ACB . . . seeks
to give students a place to vent, rant, and talk to college peers in an environment free from
social constraints and about subjects that might otherwise be taboo."). College ACB tries to
separate itself from the former Juicy Campus by "consistently host[ing] a higher level of
discourse-while still making room for occasional gossip," rather than "foster[ing] superfi-
cial interactions, [which were] often derogatory and needlessly crude." Id.
330 See College ACB, Advertise, supra note 322; The Dirty, Advertise, supra note 322.
331 Gossip Report, Terms and Conditions, supra note 298 (explaining that advertising on
the site may be provided through third-party advertisers).
332 See CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., ADDRESSABLE ONLINE ADVERTISING: GENERATE NEW SER-
VICE PROVIDER REVENUE WHILE PROTECTING PRIVACY 2 (2009), available at http://www.
cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns523/solutionoverviewc22-519980.pdf
(explaining that currently online publishers who generate revenue through advertising are
"most often" paid by an advertiser based on the "exposure of their message to a specific
audience" and that traditionally "methodologies for improving ad placement have relied
heavily on the tracking [of users'] web-browsing behavior"); WebsiteGear, Website Traffic
& Revenue, Jan. 18, 2004, http://content.websitegear.com/article/revenuetraffic.htm (dis-
cussing that operators of content-based Web sites are more likely to rely on traffic to gener-
ate revenue through advertising on their Web site and noting that, when advertising rates are
"low," even an operator of a content-based Web site will have more difficulty); see also A
Juicy Shutdown, supra note 12 (noting the founder of Juicy Campus attributed the recent
demise of his non-celebrity gossip Web site primarily to a lack of revenue from advertising).
333 E.g., Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 304 (D.N.H. 2008)
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less, an unauthorized use of a user's identity to sell advertising space on a Web
site also may constitute "some commercial purpose." '334 The operators' unau-
thorized use of an individuals' identity or persona for a commercial purpose
violates their rights to publicity when the plaintiff is identifiable from the use.
As noted above, the use of an individual's identity or persona by a publisher
in order to achieve some financial gain is merely a factor that courts consider
when determining if the use was for a trade or commercial purpose.333 If the
published work serves a legitimate public interest, it may qualify for protection
as newsworthy information. 36 The publisher will be immune to claims of vio-
lation of the right of publicity even if the publisher gains some profit or in-
creased distribution as a result.337 However, if the use is tainted by falsifica-
tions, the publisher loses the protection.338 Alternatively, if the individual,
whose identity the gossip site operators uses, is a public figure339 or if the "in-
dividual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public contro-
versy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues,""34 in-
formation about him or her fits squarely within the newsworthiness exception
to the right of publicity.
(finding that using the plaintiffs image without consent to advertise the site may be a com-
mercial use that violated the plaintiffs right of publicity); Beverley v. Choices Women's
Med. Ctr., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278 (N.Y. 1991) (finding that a calendar containing cus-
tomer satisfaction testimonials distributed to potential clients was for advertising purposes
and the unauthorized use of the plaintiffs image within it constituted a violation of her right
of publicity).
334 See, e.g., Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 536-41 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that
the defendant's continued selling of advertisements on his Web site that contained unauthor-
ized reproductions of the plaintiffs trademark constituted a commercial use of the plaintiffs
trademark even though the defendant included a disclaimer that stated that the plaintiff was
in no way associated with the defendant's Web site).
335 See, e.g., Davis v. High Soc'y Mag., Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982).
336 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977).
337 See Davis, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
338 See Pagan v. N.Y. Herald Trib., Inc., 301 N.Y.S.2d 120, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
Where a picture of an individual is published in a newspaper or magazine in connec-
tion with the presentation, without false or misleading material, of a matter of legiti-
mate public interest to readers, and the picture bears a reasonable relationship to the
presentation, the use of the picture in the publication is not actionable as a use for the
purpose of advertising or trade within the prohibition of the statute unless the presenta-
tion is in effect an advertisement in disguise.
Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmts. c-d (1995).
339 Palmer v. Schonhorn Enter., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 460 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967)
("A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame or mode
of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest
in his doings, his affairs and his character, has become a public personage."); see also Doug-
lass v. Hustler Mag., 769 F.2d 1128, 1139, 1141 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that an actress was
a public figure for rights of publicity purposes).
340 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
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It is extremely difficult to argue that by attending a party, by cheating on
your significant other, or by being well-known on campus,34' an individual,
who otherwise would not be considered a public figure, is elevated to such a
level due to a classmate, a jealous ex, or a total stranger deciding to gossip
about that individual on the Internet. Such an involuntary forfeiture of the right
to control one's image and private information seems inconsistent with con-
gressional intent in enacting the CDA.342 Additionally, the proliferation of po-
tentially defamatory gossip neither serves the public interest nor enhances le-
gitimate use of the Internet. Moreover, as noted above, if the individual can
prove that information surrounding the use of his or her identity is false, the
potential immunity arising under the newsworthy exception would not apply.343
Therefore, if a plaintiff can demonstrate that a defendant misappropriated
his or her identity for use in a commercial manner and the plaintiff is identifi-
able from that use, the plaintiff has a valid claim for infringement of his or her
right of publicity.3" To demonstrate that a gossip Web site is using an individ-
ual's identity for a commercial purpose, the individual need only show that the
Web site operator is gaining revenue through advertisements on the site345 and
that the individual is not a public figure and the information itself does nothing
to serve the public interest.3 46 Accordingly, any revenue-generating non-
celebrity gossip Web site whose users' gossip identifies an individual is expos-
ing the Web site operator to claims for violating the individual's right of pub-
licity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Non-celebrity gossip Web site operators often claim that the CDA shields
them from liability for lawsuits arising from their users' content.347 Although
34 1 These examples can be easily found on any of the non-celebrity gossip sites; in the
interest of not facilitating the spread of gossip, the specific comments will not be reproduced
here. However, a cursory search of College ACB, the Dirty, or Gossip Report will uncover a
large number of examples. See, e.g., College ACB, supra note 2; The Dirty, supra note 21;
GossipReport.com, supra note 21.
342 Cf 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2000) (identifying encouraging free market competition,
supporting technological advances, and enforcing of criminal laws as policies of the United
States in relation to the internet).
343 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47.
344 See id § 46.
345 See supra Part V.A; cf Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 539-41 (6th Cir. 2006)
(finding that the defendant's continued sales of advertisements on his Web site that con-
tained unauthorized reproductions of the plaintiff's identifiable trademark constituted a
commercial use of the plaintiffs trademark even though the defendant included a disclaimer
that stated that the plaintiff was in no way associated with the defendant's Web site).
346 See supra Part V.B.
347 See, e.g., The Dirty, Kochran Kardashian, supra note 26 (explaining the CDA pro-
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the CDA does provide immunity in most cases, these Web site operators' ac-
tions are sometimes outside the expansive scope of CDA immunity. Moreover,
some of the third party content published on these Web sites violates individu-
als' intellectual property rights, namely the right of publicity.
The CDA provides interactive computer service providers with extensive
immunity from state tort claims based on third-party content.34 However, this
immunity is not without its limits: the CDA does not shield service providers
from claims based on intellectual property violations, including the right of
publicity. 49 Thus, when the published third party gossip identifies the subject
of the gossip--either by name, photograph, other biographical information, or
some combination thereof-and the gossip Web site generates revenue through
advertising, this commercial use violates the individual's right of publicity, and
CDA immunity does not apply.
tects the Dirty against potential claims arising out of content posted by third parties).
348 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000).
349 Id. § 230(e)(2).
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